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                                               Introduction 
  The main focus of this thesis is the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the 
national flag and anthem of Japan in 1999 and its connections to what seems to be an 
atypical Japanese form of postwar nationalism. In the 1980s a campaign headed by 
among others Prime Minister Nakasone was promoted to increase the pride of the 
Japanese in their nation and to achieve a “transformation of national consciousness”.1 
Its supporters tended to use the term “healthy nationalism and internationalism”.  
     When discussing the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and 
anthem of Japan, it is necessary to look into the nationalism that became evident in the 
1980s and see to what extent the legalization is connected with it. Furthermore we must 
discuss whether the legalization would have been possible without the emergence of so-
called “healthy nationalism and internationalism”. 
     Thus it is first necessary to discuss and try to clarify the confusing terms of  “healthy 
nationalism and patriotism”. Secondly, we must look into why and how the so-called 
“healthy nationalism and internationalism” occurred and address the question of why its 
occurrence was controversial.  
     The field of education seems to be the area of Japanese society where the 
controversy regarding its occurrence was strongest. The Ministry of Education, 
Monbushō, and the Japan Teachers' Union, Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai (hereafter 
Nikkyōso), were the main opponents struggling over the issue of Hinomaru, and 
especially Kimigayo, due to its lyrics praising the emperor. Accordingly one must 
discuss the connection between the imperial institution and Kimigayo, the base on 
which much resistance is built, before trying to clarify in what way the political 
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campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” influenced the field of 
education. 
     In this respect we cannot avoid asking to what extent the influence on the field of 
education formed the basis of the law recognizing Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the 
national flag and national anthem. 
     Finally it is important to address the present situation, where the use of the national 
flag and the national anthem at school ceremonies has reached levels close to 100 %. 
The question must be asked whether the aim concerning a transformation of national 
consciousness has been achieved through the campaign of healthy nationalism, the use 
of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at school ceremonies and the legalization of the national 
symbols. 
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 Chapter 1:The immediate background for the legalization of Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo 
 On February 28th 1999 principal Ishikawa at Sera senior high school in Hiroshima 
prefecture committed suicide.2 He had been exposed to pressure concerning the singing 
of Kimigayo at the graduation ceremony by the local school board, teachers and the 
Buraku Liberation League, which works against discrimination of minorities in school. 
  In 1989 Monbushō issued a revision of the education guidelines that for the first 
time made the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at entrance and graduation ceremonies 
mandatory.3 Previously it had been desirable. Since Nikkyōso opposed their use among 
others because of the symbols’ war connection, many schools had avoided them.  
 Since the 1989 revision the use increased and according to the Monbushō national 
survey in 1998, more than 98% of public schools used Hinomaru and more than 80% 
Kimigayo.4 However, there were exceptions. Hiroshima was a prefecture where the use 
of Kimigayo remained low. In 1998 only 11,7 % of the senior high schools used 
Kimigayo at the graduation ceremony.5 
  How is this to be accounted for? When explaining the variations regarding 
compliance to the instructions, Yoshino lists the experience of the Second World War 
as a reason why areas such as Hiroshima and Okinawa have shown low support.6 
However, this explanation does not hold water for Nagasaki, which also suffered from 
atomic bombing, but where the percentages have been high.  
   In 19878 only about 25 percent of the teachers in Nagasaki were organized, which 
may explain why all schools hoisted Hinomaru and used Kimigayo at both ceremonies 
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in 1999.9 In Hiroshima about 55 percent of the teachers were organized in 1998,10 
which may be another explanation for the opposition. 
 Due to the opposition Monbushō instructed a “correction” in May 1998. As a result 
the Hiroshima Prefectural Board of Education in February 1999 through the exceptional 
measure of “an order to do one’s duty”, demanded senior high school principals to make 
sure Kimigayo was used at the graduation ceremonies.11 Numerous teachers objected 
and, like many other principals, Ishikawa repeatedly held meetings to solve the 
problem. 
  In addition to the objecting teachers, the Buraku Liberation League threatened that if 
Kimigayo were sung at the ceremony, the minority pupils would boycott it.  
 
“For minorities in Japan, trapped in a marginal status without access to the high-status 
positions afforded to other members of the society, the Emperor, together with the flag 
and the anthem, have become symbols of the discrimination against them.”12 
   
  A minority boycott would show who were minority members, which the 
representatives found unacceptable, due to discrimination. Thus the most convenient 
situation would be that Kimigayo was not sung, meaning the boycott could be avoided.    
However, the local school board ordered the singing. Though he tried to find a solution, 
the principal failed, and in the morning the day before the ceremony he hung himself. 
The ceremony was held as scheduled. Teachers and students did not sing Kimigayo, nor 
was the melody played. Hinomaru was displayed on the stage but halfway through the 
ceremony the curtain was lowered and the flag was no longer visible.13 
   Three days before the suicide, Prime Minister Obuchi stated he was not considering 
the legislation of Hinomaru and Kimigayo.14 However, the suicide caused public 
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commotion and huge headlines. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka commented that if the 
decision were entrusted to schools, tragic incidents would occur and expressed that he 
wanted the legal formalizing of the symbols.15 On March 4th he spoke of the national 
flag and anthem as “based on a long lasting custom”16 and said legislation would not 
change the use in schools.17 The Minister of Education Yūuma also made a similar 
statement in Parliament.18  
  However, this was a point on which the members of the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) did not necessarily agree. Some wanted the mandatory use of Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo at entrance and graduation ceremonies included in the law. LDP Chief 
Secretary Murakami said: “To make [the symbols] mandatory is natural. If it is left to 
the schools to decide, nothing will change and confusion will also occur.”19 
Concerning the issue Prime Minister Obuchi commented: 
 
”I thought it was not necessary to legalize the national flag and anthem, because… 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem have been established, based on 
a long lasting custom and because they have taken a firm hold on a wide range of the 
people.  
However…as we proceed towards the 21st century and furthermore, as there among 
the foreign countries are countries that have legalized the national flag and the national 
anthem, we have at this time begun to consider legalizing the national flag and the 
national anthem, because we think the time has come for our country, which has written 
laws as its principal, to consider rooting the national flag anthem more deeply through a 
written law.”20  
   
A 1978 opinion poll showed that 92 percent thought Hinomaru appropriate as “the 
national flag”, while the Kimigayo percentage as regards “the national anthem” was 
80,7.21 However, in late June 1999 the opinion seemed more divided, especially 
regarding Kimigayo. Though the flag was the same, Hinomaru was not referred to as 
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“the national flag”, as mentioned above. Instead merely the expression “the flag” was 
used. While 79 percent confirmed harboring friendly feelings towards “the flag” 
Hinomaru, 65 percent answered yes concerning “the song” Kimigayo. 31 percent said 
no regarding harboring friendly feelings towards Kimigayo.22  
 Supporters of the government such as the Liberal Party argued since most Japanese 
and foreigners acknowledge Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem, 
legalization was the natural solution.23 New Komeito said the symbols have taken root 
deeply in the Japanese population. As such the party considered it a matter concerning 
the foundation of Japan. Though the party recognized that to some people the symbols 
are connected with militarism, speaking of the “Peace Constitution”, it stressed that the 
symbols would not lead to the revival of militarism and saw legalization as an option.24   
 Also the Democratic Party of Japan commented that most people within Japan and 
abroad recognize Hinomaru and Kimigayo as Japan’s national flag and anthem. 
However, many party members opposed legislation. It mentioned the opposition some 
people felt and the need of an education raising a correct understanding of the symbols. 
Furthermore, the party emphasized the need to achieve national consensus.25 
Yomiuri Shimbun supported the conservative forces’ arguments and mentioned 
international sports events and the UN as arenas where the symbols are taken for 
granted. It said most people in the world think Hinomaru and Kimigayo are the national 
flag and anthem of Japan. “However, within Japan there is only one group of people 
who do not recognize the national flag and the national anthem, thus causing confusion 
in the school arena.”26 It argued that if the confusion in the schools continued, 
legislation could be considered.27  
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 Critics claimed that the government was cunningly taking advantage of the suicide. 
Both the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP) opposed 
legislation. SDP did not recognize the symbols, but stressed that the issue should be left 
for the people to decide. It also emphasized that to people of Asia Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo were symbols of warfare.28 JCP opposed Hinomaru and Kimigayo and 
emphasized their lack of any legal foundation. It criticized the legislation as an 
implementation from above without achieving the consensus of the people, and urged 
the need to create a new national flag and anthem suitable for modern Japan.29 
 Asahi Shimbun30 was more in line with the opposing parties and said that it was 
unfortunate that the school arena was confused over the issue. Thus it was necessary to 
think of measures in order to prevent tragedies. However, it argued that legislation 
would not solve the problem and that using legislation to deal with the school situation 
was to do things in the wrong order. The newspaper saw the enforcement in the schools 
of a problem over which adults were divided, as a reason for the current confused 
situation. 
 Nonaka said legislation would not mean force. Asahi31 argued against this saying the 
use was already practically mandatory and legislation would reinforce this. It pointed 
out that in Hiroshima senior high schools principals who did not sing or play Kimigayo, 
were punished for not following “the order to do one’s duty.” In Hiroshima during the 
school year April 1998 to March 1999 as many as 155 principals were punished; 17 got 
an official warning, while 136 became the object of “instructions”.32 The newspaper 
said that adding to the pressure through legislation and silencing opposing opinions 
were not democratic methods and would only cause bad feelings. 
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While Yomiuri Shimbun blamed one group of people – the teachers - for causing 
confusion in schools, Asahi Shimbun33 blamed Monbushō. It said that the guidelines on 
education that made Hinomaru and Kimigayo mandatory were to blame, and that to 
push through the legislation in a hurry by piling up even more unreasonableness on the 
present unreasonableness would not solve the school problem. 
 Critics such as JCP, SDP and Asahi Shimbun34 said the solution would be to reverse 
the guidelines and urged for a thorough discussion to establish consensus instead of a 
rash method aimed at the school arena. However, the bill codifying Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem was submitted to the Diet on June 11th,  
1999. 35  
   Before 1945 the official meaning of Kimigayo had been “the emperor’s reign”. 
However, after the war Monbushō gave no formal interpretation. “The Ministry did not 
formally deny the pre-war interpretation either.”36  The Prime Minister’s Office states 
there is no official translation of Kimigayo.37 A common translation is Chamberlain’s. 
(1850-1935).  
 
 
         Kimigayo wa                 Thousands of years of happy reign be thine;     
Chiyo ni yachiyo ni       Rule on, my lord, till what are pebbles now 
Sazare-ishi no               By age united to mighty rocks shall grow 
Iwao to narite               Whose venerable sides the moss doth line. 
Koke no musu made 
     
      In connection with the deliberation of the bill the government presented its 
interpretation of the meaning of the symbols at the first deliberations in the House of 
Representatives on June 29th, 1999.    
 8
     Prime Minister Obuchi said it is appropriate to interpret Kimi as the emperor, who is 
the symbol of Japan and of the unity of the Japanese people.38 Regarding the lyrics he 
said that it is appropriate to interpret the words as a prayer for lasting peace and the 
prosperity of Japan. In early June, Obuchi also explained that before the war Kimigayo 
meant an era reigned by His Majesty the Emperor. However, after the war it means an 
era not reigned by the emperor, thus it is an era reigned by the people themselves.39    
    In connection with the deliberation of the bill on June 29th, 1999 Obuchi revised his 
interpretation.40 This explanation concerning Hinomaru was quite similar, except for the 
fact that the prayer for the lasting peace and prosperity of Japan was changed to “a 
prayer for the lasting peace and stability of our country”. He also emphasized that when 
speaking of the emperor, it is the emperor, based on the general will of the people, with 
whom sovereignty lies, that is indicated.41    
     However, this does not mean that the people accept the official interpretation.42 
According to the 1999 opinion poll, 50 percent said they thought the government’s 
interpretation of Kimi as the emperor as the symbol of Japan and of the unity of the 
Japanese people was correct, while 40 percent did not see it this way.43 
     An absolute majority passed the law concerning the national flag and anthem on July 
22nd (the vote was 403 to 86) in the Lower House. It was enacted by the Upper House 
on August 9th by the vote 166 to 71,44 and was promulgated and put into force on 
August 13th.45 The LDP, the Liberal Party, and New Komeito voted in favor, while JCP 
and SPD voted against. The Democratic Party of Japan was divided over the issue. In 
the Upper House 20 members voted in favor, while 31 voted against.46 
      The government responded quickly. 47 On August 9th, Hinomaru was used at the 
press conferences of among others the Prime Minister’s Official Residence and the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At a cabinet meeting on August 10th Nonaka instructed 
public offices to hoist the national flag at the opening of new government offices and on 
public holidays. In addition the Minister of Education Yūuma repeated that the 
legalization would not change the situation in the schools.48 
     The legalization was strongly controversial. Concerning the question of whether it is 
necessary to legalize Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem of Japan, 
a 1978 opinion poll showed that 43,7 percent considered it necessary, while 48 percent 
did not find it necessary. In the case of Kimigayo the respective percentage was 43,2 
and 48,8.49 The 1999 opinion poll conducted in late June while the matter was being 
discussed in the Diet, showed that 59 percent found it necessary to legalize Hinomaru 
and 47 percent found it necessary to legalize Kimigayo.50 58 percent said they agreed 
with the proposal. However only 23 percent thought they should be legalized in August 
1999, 66 percent said the question should be thoroughly discussed first.51   
       Organizations such as the Network against Hinomaru and Kimigayo and the Japan 
Congress, which supports the legalization, and numerous other organizations that either 
support or oppose the legislation have been formed.52 The symbols are associated with 
WW II, but it is mostly because of the lyrics of Kimigayo that praise the Emperor and 
hope his reign may last forever, that reactions have been strong. 
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                  Chapter 2: Nationalism and Patriotism – Confusing terms 
     It seems the problem connected with Hinomaru and Kimigayo often is a problem of 
confusing terms. Different people use words such as “return to prewar nationalism” and 
“the promotion of healthy nationalism or patriotism” to describe the same issue, thus 
causing confusion.   
    It should be stressed that few studies of nationalism deal with the case of Japan. As 
Sandra Wilson writes, “reference to the Japanese case is almost entirely missing from 
the contemporary theoretical literature on nation and nationalism.” 53 Wilson suggests 
this might be because Japan does not quite conform to the best-known models of 
nationalism, which have tended to focus on colonies’ struggle for independence or 
groups within an established nation state fighting for autonomy.  It is therefore 
necessary to look into the problem of how to describe nationalism itself, before focusing 
on the main topic of this thesis. 
     Nationalism is a word that often appears in the modern world, and as a term it has 
been used at least since the eighteenth century.54 “Partly because nationalism manifests 
itself in various guises and partly because the term is used for different purposes, it is an 
ambiguous concept.”55 It has been connected with the rise of nation states and with 
struggles for national independence. However, its meanings have changed over time, 
and today it is a term that invites confusion. 
      In the words of Kemiläinen, “One of the most difficult problems of the study of 
nationalism is … the question of what is meant by nationalism.”56 Kemiläinen says that 
in the writing of history nationalism has been used since the 1920s to mean both a 
theory and a period – the age of nationalism. The word was not frequently used before 
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the end of the nineteenth century, a statement Kemiläinen bases on the lack of 
definitions of nationalism in dictionaries and lexicons.57  
    Many writers have dealt with the problem of how to define nationalism, but as Shafer 
points out, the study of nationalism has not been able to establish an accurate definition.   
 
“students have found flaws and omissions, and for the purposes of their own studies or 
influenced by their own political philosophies have proceeded to form their own 
definitions. Clarity has seldom been achieved, scientific study has thus been hindered”.  
      
     Shafer argues that a short, scientific definition that would include everything 
belonging to nationalism might be impossible. However, “if nationalism is to be 
understood, clearer general understanding of what the word means must be achieved.”58 
     The Encyclopedia Americana’s article on nationalism distinguishes between 
anticolonial, secessionist, unifying, integrationist, irredentist and exclusive forms of 
nationalism. Furthermore it is stated:  
 
 
some aspect of the concept.”60  
“Compounding the difficulty of defining nationalism is the fact that the term has been
applied to a variety of phenomena that may be related to but are distinct from 
nationalism: patriotism, chauvinism, xenophobia, racism, and popular sentiment.”59 
“These concepts are more limited concepts than nationalism or are extreme 
manifestations of 
  
A clear distinction is made between patriotism and nationalism, and it is pointed out 
that nationalism is not simply loyalty to the state, a concept that “is appropriately called 
patriotism.”61 However, it is not said when loyalty to the state or patriotism stops being 
simply loyalty to the state and turns into nationalism, with its more threatening 
connotations. 
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 When dealing with the issues of Hinomaru and Kimigayo and Japanese nationalism, 
how to distinguish nationalism from patriotism or so-called “healthy nationalism” 
becomes an evident and unavoidable question. It might be that it is not possible to make 
a clear distinction. Though he too does not refer to the case of Japan, Billig in his 
“Banal Nationalism” pays much attention to the confusion of terms. Thereby he makes 
an important effort to clarify the concept of nationalism in the modern world.  
  He criticizes previous studies and definitions of nationalism, not so much because of 
what they include but because of what they leave out. He argues that former studies 
focus on nationalism as “hot nationalism” or extremism, and emphasize the gap 
between “us” and “them”. Furthermore they ignore the so-called healthy nationalism or 
patriotism of the established democracies of the world. In accordance, he extends the 
definition of nationalism and includes everyday patriotism, or what is often referred to 
as healthy nationalism, and speaks of “banal nationalism” or “everyday nationalism”. 
   Billig points out that in both popular and academic writings, nationalism is 
associated with those who struggle to create new states or with extreme right-wing 
politicians.62 This means that former President Bush, who headed an international 
coalition against Iraq or his son, present President Bush, who headed a smaller coalition 
against Iraq, presented themselves as the representatives of global morality and justice. 
Accordingly they are often not seen as nationalists, whereas for example Serbian 
guerrillas were. According to studies of nationalism, which focus on “hot nationalism” 
or extremism, separatists, fascists and guerrillas are the problems of nationalism, not the 
leaders of democracies.  
  Billig continues: “Yet there is something misleading about this accepted use of the 
word ‘nationalism’. It always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery.”63 This 
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makes it possible for those who live in the established nations at the center of things to 
consider nationalism the property of others and to ignore the nationalism of their own 
nations. Instead it is common – and one might say more comfortable, to use words such 
as patriotism and loyalty when describing one‘s own feelings towards one‘s own 
country. 
 Billig states that when dealing with nationalism, academics have tended to ignore 
what he refers to as “banal nationalism”. While using projecting theories of nationalism, 
which define nationalism in a limited way and project it onto others, they have often at 
the same time naturalized the nationalism of the established nations out of existence 
through the use of naturalizing theories of nationalism. These theories take a world of 
nation states for granted and consider loyalty to one’s own nation to be natural. Banal 
nationalism is not seen as nationalism, but a lack of patriotism can be seen as a cause 
for concern,64 which in Japan has been the point of view of among others Prime 
Minister Nakasone. 
 Studies of nationalism have often considered nationalism as the force that creates 
nation states and have focused less on what happens to nationalism within an 
established nation state. Gellner distinguishes between agrarian and industrial societies, 
and argues that nationalism did not exist in the agrarian societies. It existed mainly in 
the early stages of industrialization. According to Gellner, nationalism emerges only 
when the existence of the state “is already very much taken for granted,”65 and he 
believes that nationalism may fade away in more “mature, homogenous” industrial 
societies. However, he does not “describe what happens to nationalism once the nation-
state is established. It is as if nationalism suddenly disappears.”66 It only continues to 
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exist as a threat to the established nation, remote from everyday life. As Billig puts it, 
the problem is not “what such theories describe as nationalist, but what they omit.” 67  
  It is very common to hear both politicians and ordinary citizens speak of patriotism 
or healthy nationalism. However, the question arises whether it is possible to arrive at 
an accurate, waterproof way to distinguish these terms from nationalism of a more 
extreme kind. Patriotism is often seen as natural, necessary and praiseworthy, whereas 
nationalism is considered a threat. Academics also argue in favor of a distinction 
between the two, saying that patriotism and nationalism represents two very different 
states of mind.68 
  However, it seems difficult to distinguish between the different terms so easily, and 
Billig says that one must extend the common definitions of nationalism and include the 
so-called patriotism and healthy nationalism. The question must also be asked whether 
the latter has only positive forces, or whether it might have dangerous aspects as well.  
 In my native Norway the flagging of everyday nationalism is indeed evident. The 
children’s parade marching up the Karl Johan street of Oslo to greet the royal family at 
the balcony of the castle on the 17th of May in memory of the Constitution of 1814, 
marks the yearly peak of what most Norwegians would probably never refer to as 
everyday nationalism. Instead the word patriotism would most likely be used. It might 
very well be the case that such manifestations are not necessarily negative, they might 
even be positive. However, what is dangerous is to simply ignore everyday nationalism 
among “us” and project nationalism onto “the others”, assuming that “our patriotism” 
can never be dangerous, but “their nationalism” is. 
 In contradiction to the assumption that hatred of others is a motivation for war, Billig 
refers to Jean Bethke Elshtain’s analysis, in which it is argued that “in the past century 
 15
young men have gone to war in their millions motivated not primarily by hatred of the 
enemy, but by a ‘will-to-sacrifice’.”69 
 Furthermore, it should be stressed how so-called positive patriotism has been an 
eager supporter of recent wars. When a nation’s interests are at stake in the modern 
world, whether it is the matter of Great Britain’s pride in the Falklands war or US oil 
interests, as was the case during the Gulf war, it is supported by the population.  
 The Bush presidents have in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and in connection with 
the current Iraq question presented the national interests of the US as a new world order 
that claims to represent morality and justice. Globalization becomes a disguise for 
national interests, which are often overlooked in such conflicts, where the US appearing 
as a world police, and claims to speak on behalf of the world.  
  However, it is important to keep in mind that claims for world justice are not 
absolute. The US did not lead an international coalition of outrage when Indonesia, a 
substantial oil producer, annexed East Timor in 1975. Furthermore it is a world that 
does not include the countries that represent a threat to the national interests of the 
countries headed by the US, as for example Iraq. 
 Traditional definitions of nationalism, which do not include everyday nationalism, in 
fact simply define away the nationalism of the established countries and thereby 
conflicts such as the Gulf war70 - and for that matter the peaceful Norwegian May 17th 
parade - as subjects of studies of nationalism. 
 When national interests are at stake, Billig shows that everyday nationalism can be a 
supporting force behind nationalistic warfare. He does not, however, address 
sufficiently the issues of whether everyday nationalism and linked national identity can 
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be something positive, or whether it is possible to find a healthy balance, which seems 
to be lacking in the discussions concerning the topic of Japanese nationalism.  
  It seems that the problems connected with the question of Hinomaru and Kimigayo -
and the related issues of Yasukuni Jinja and history textbooks to a certain extent are a 
problem of confusing terms and different perceptions of nationalism. Critics both within 
Japan and abroad have frequently claimed that the legalization of Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo as the national flag and the national anthem, the visits of Prime Minister 
Nakasone in 1985 and of Prime Minister Koizumi in 2001, 2002 and 2003 to the 
Yasukuni Jinja and the history textbook problem indicate a Japanese return to 
nationalism. 
 When saying this, critics often have in mind what is referred to as prewar 
nationalism, a subject that “is painfully associated with partially unresolved wartime 
issues”.71 The promoters of such controversial issues, on the other hand, tend to speak 
of healthy nationalism. However, it seems that the different sides, while using similar 
terms, have different things in mind, and that there exist various forms of nationalism. 
As Cripps has commented concerning the issue of Hinomaru and Kimigayo:  
 
“to see the controversy purely in terms of an argument between nationalists and liberals 
is unduly simplistic. The conflict is in many respects a dispute between different kinds of 
nationalism.”72  
 
    In the case of Japan it seems to be “a conflict of image and an intellectual row about 
the attitudes to, and definitions of, what Japan is and what it means to be Japanese.”73 
While the campaigns initiated by Japanese Prime Ministers aim at promoting what they 
see as healthy nationalism or patriotism, critics tend to think of the extreme nationalism 
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of prewar times. The fact that the opponents have different associations thus makes 
fruitful discussions difficult.     
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           Chapter 3: The occurrence of “healthy nationalism and internationalism”   
      In the 1980s a political campaign often referred to by its supporters as “healthy 
nationalism and internationalism” was promoted to renew Japanese pride and 
patriotism. At the same time, education policy and education reform became an area of 
national concern. Education became the arena where, among others, Prime Minister 
Nakasone set out to promote traditional values.  
     The policies promoted in the 1980s were more than merely attempts to reform the 
education system; it seems their aim was to serve as a basis for a way of thinking about 
Japanese identity. Thus the question must be asked why the supporters of the so-called 
“healthy nationalism and internationalism” found it necessary to initiate such a political 
campaign.  
     Often support of one’s own country in the name of patriotism is taken for granted 
and a lack of it can be seen as a problem, which seems to be what concerned Nakasone, 
Prime Minister from 1982 to 1987. Due to the war experiences of the 1930s and 40s, 
being proud of Japan was a concept with very negative connotations.  
      Schoppa argues that Nakasone believed many areas “of Japanese politics had 
become ‘taboo’ due to the nation’s experience of militarism and defeat.” Therefore he 
set out to review the postwar legacy74 and to rid the Japanese system of what he 
perceived as the influence of the American occupation. He saw such a move as another 
step towards “settling the accounts of postwar politics75” and towards Japan’s 
emergence as an independent country on the world stage.”76 Accordingly the aim of his 
“grand design” was to get “the Japanese to set aside their ‘postwar complex’ and to see 
their country as a ‘big power’” .77 
     To justify increasing patriotism because of increasing internationalism he argued:  
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“Each country has a long history, traditions and culture…its heritage. That is the 
foundation…It is to love the long history, traditions and culture. On top of this, it is then 
to use them to contribute to the rest of the world. Without knowing the foundation, you 
cannot exchange with other countries…It is to plant a flower of Japan in the global 
garden.”78 
      
Furthermore Nakasone said: 
 
“It is important that we unite in peace and culture around the Emperor, that we 
contribute culturally, politically, and economically to the rest of the world, that we join 
together with other nations in seriously considering these issues, and that we share our 
prosperity with the rest of the global community. Yet we cannot do any of this unless we 
are also confident of our own identity. A nationalism that endeavors to foster self-identity 
in this sense is a completely justifiable nationalism. And we must teach it through 
education.”79 
 
     Thus, “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was a political method used to 
justify increasing patriotism in society in general, and particularly in the field of 
education, because of increasing internationalization, making education policy the 
center of national attention. A Mainichi Shimbun80 opinion poll showed that more than 
half of those asked expressed dissatisfaction with the school situation, but even so, 
education policy and education reform had not been the major interest of public 
concern.  
     Public concern was triggered mainly by two episodes of school violence in February 
1983 that received wide attention. In Yokohama some junior and senior high school 
students were arrested for attacking a group of sleeping homeless people, killing three.81 
Three days later a Tokyo junior high school teacher stabbed one of his students with a 
knife in order to defend himself from the beating of several of his students.82   
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     The result was an increasing focus on school violence and a feeling of crisis. 
Conservative forces claimed violence was the result of a lack of moral education in the 
postwar schools; in order to deal with the moral decline of its youth Japan needed to 
return to the morals once taught by the Imperial Rescript on Education. However, others 
linked the violence to “deeper problems in the Japanese education system as a whole”, 
such as the pressure of examinations.83 
    “Nakasone had always been interested in changing some aspects of Japan and its 
society, including elements of the education system.”84 Hood argues his aim was not 
limited to school violence and examination pressure, it seems to have been almost a 
secondary issue and a means to change aspects of society. “What he appears to have 
been seeking was a reform of the sort of Japanese person ‘produced’ by the education 
system, and this would be a stepping stone to a reform of society as a whole.”85  
     However, it should be noted that the public did not necessarily support the 
conservative forces’ attempts at increasing patriotism. The Mainichi Shimbun86 opinion 
poll mentioned above showed that 69 % said there was no need to promote the idea of 
protecting one’s country in schools. The public focus was on international peace, 
maintaining the order of society, and protecting nature, traditions and culture.  
      In 1967 an attempt to reform the education system was made when Monbushō 
“made a little-noticed ‘request for advice’ from the Central Council on Education”87 , 
Chūkyōshin, an advisory body within Monbushō. Schoppa sees the university crises of 
the late 1960s as the main reason for the publicity concerning Chūkyōshin. It issued 
basic guidelines for reform in 1971 and called for flexibility and diversity. Among 
others it suggested alternatives to the standard 6-3-3-system of six years of elementary 
school, three years of junior high school and three years of senior high school, and to 
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establish a system requiring new teachers to undergo a probationary year before being 
employed.  
      Nikkyōso, the Japan Teachers’ Union, was seen as an opponent of change when it 
worked against the education reform by participating in bringing together many separate 
groups under the “People’s Coalition for the Promotion of Democratic Education”.88 
Despite the efforts of Chūkyōshin, substantial reform was not achieved.  
      Nakasone claimed the main reason for the failure of the 1971 reform was that 
Monbushō had dominated it.89 He initiated a second attempt at reform through the 
establishment of an Ad Hoc Council on Education, Rinkyōshin, an advisory body 
directly under the control of the Nakasone cabinet.90  The Diet was given some 
supervision, while Monbushō directed the council’s secretariat. Mori Yoshirō, a young 
LDP specialist on education was appointed Education Minister.91  
     Many of the members were appointed directly by Nakasone, however his influence 
should not be exaggerated. In the committee of 1971 there had been no members of 
Nikkyōso, or a single teacher. A teacher, who was a member of Nikkyōso, was 
appointed to Rinkyōshin, but her ties to the Ministry seemed more important, because 
she had worked with the Ministry on a morality project.92  
     Various forces from the conservative sector made up Rinkyōshin. Asahi Shimbun93 
was concerned that the committee, which consisted of elite people, might have 
problems gaining the support of ordinary people. It worked for three years and 
published four reports. The success of the council therefore depended on whether the 
members were able to agree or not.         
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            What made “healthy nationalism and internationalism” controversial? 
      Before looking into how the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” 
influenced the field of education through the implementation of the education reform, it 
is necessary to address the issue of why the so-called “healthy nationalism and 
internationalism” was controversial in the first place. 
     According to Nakasone the Japanese system of education created broilers who 
focused on nothing but the difficult university entrance exams. He stressed the need to 
teach people to understand and respect their own culture and traditions.94 Rinkyōshin 
adopted the ideology of “healthy nationalism and internationalism” and focused on what 
was presented as a healthy balance of love for Japan and respect and tolerance towards 
foreign nations and their cultures.95  
     Consequently it was argued that one cannot profess an internationalist perspective 
without first possessing a clear sense of identity. The question must be asked why this 
so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” and the education policy with 
which it was connected, was controversial.  
     As mentioned when discussing the terms of nationalism and patriotism, terminology 
is at the root of the problem. Opponents saw the political campaign of “healthy 
nationalism and internationalism” as a threat and a possible return to prewar 
nationalism. Supporters considered Nakasone’s way of thinking as the promotion of 
necessary healthy nationalism or patriotism, allegedly lacking among the younger 
generations of Japanese. As such it dealt not merely with Japan’s relations with other 
countries but also with Japanese identity.  
     The balance between love for Japan and respect and tolerance towards foreign 
nations was at the core of “healthy nationalism and internationalism”. However, it 
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seems the wish to strengthen Japan’s position in the world and to increase the Japanese 
people’s love for Japan might have been the dominating part of Nakasone and his 
supporters’ philosophy. This resulted in a lack of credibility regarding respect towards 
foreign nations. In this sense, as the following examples illustrate, lack of credibility 
became a major reason for the controversy regarding “healthy nationalism and 
internationalism”.  
     The promotion of “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was accompanied by 
the emergence of problems concerning history textbooks, which tended to ignore 
Japanese war crimes on the Korean Peninsula and in China. The incidents caused 
vehement protests from China, South and North Korea, and resulted in the resignation 
of Monbushō ministers. The various history textbook incidents were clearly not seen as 
a token of Japan’s tolerance towards other cultures. 
      Nakasone argued that true independence was not possible as long as Japan depended 
on the US for its military defense. Consequently he wanted to revise article nine of the 
constitution, according to which Japan renounces “war as a sovereign right of the 
nation”. He also called for “military appropriations exceeding the 1 per cent of gross 
national product that had been allocated in the past.” 96 This goal was reached in 1988 
when according to some calculations, Japan’s expenditures on defense were the world’s 
third highest. Together with the history textbook incidents, this policy of defense was 
seen as a matter of concern by neighboring countries. 
     Furthermore, as a part of the campaign to restore “healthy nationalism” Nakasone on 
the 15th of August 1985, forty years after the end of the war, visited the Yasukuni 
shrine, where those who have died in the service of the state, are honored. The names of 
Japanese soldiers, who died in WW II, are engraved there and in 1978 the names of 14 
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convicted class A war criminals, including Tōjō, were engraved as well. Because of the 
shrine’s strong association with the war, the visits of prime ministers have caused and 
continue to cause negative reactions both in Japan and in neighboring countries. 
     Though the visit provoked vehement protests both within Japan and abroad, Hood 
argues that Nakasone saw it as his duty as a Japanese prime minister to pay respect to 
the war dead at least once:  
 
“Thank you for all your hardships and pains. Rest assured, we shall build a new Japan 
as a peaceful state.”97 
      
      The call for the promotion of traditional values in education and the reassertion of 
Japanese pride and self-identity in general, coincided with a wave of so-called 
“Nihonjiron” books in the 1970s and 80s. These books stressed Japan’s supposedly 
unique cultural heritage as a reason for its economic success. A book such as Vogel’s 
“Japan as number one” made it to the top of the best-seller lists. Though it is a book on 
how to learn from Japan, more copies of it were sold in Japan than in any other 
country.98 In his book “The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness” Dale refers to the 
“Nihonjinron” as the “commercialized expression of modern Japanese nationalism.”99  
      In a time of increasing internationalization these books were used to define and to 
exaggerate the so-called uniqueness of Japan to the extent that they tended to ignore the 
respect of different cultures, supposedly a vital part of the political camping of “healthy 
nationalism and internationalism”.  
     In 1986 Nakasone claimed that the reason why Japan’s economy was better than the 
US economy, was that while homogenous Japanese inhabited Japan, in the US there 
were blacks, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.100 This notorious remark had much in 
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common with the way of thinking often presented by the “Nihonjinron”. It caused 
commotion both in Japan and abroad and certainly made critics doubt his sincerity, both 
in respect to statements concerning Yasukuni and his respect for foreign countries. 
Furthermore it made them place him in line with the theories of the “Nihonjinron”.101  
     Even though some of Nakasone’s statements are extreme at the best of times, it does 
seem likely that there is a connection between the militarism of the 1930s and 40s and 
the lack of emphasis on Japanese culture and traditions in education in postwar Japan. 
Because of the war experience, more positive aspects of Japanese culture and traditions 
have to a certain extent been neglected.102 When talking with young Japanese103 one is 
often left with the impression that there are many things about their country – both 
positive and negative aspects – that they are not familiar with, which might lead one to 
think that changes are indeed necessary within education and in society in general.  
     However, it should be stressed that the main problem regarding “healthy nationalism 
and internationalism” seems to have been a lack of credibility or trust caused to a large 
extent by the unfortunate tendency to emphasize positive aspects while the problem of 
facing war responsibility remained buried and ignored under a mountain of taboos - 
both in the schools and in society in general.  
     It would seem that the aim of the conservative forces was to arrive at a clear sense of 
identity by moving on, while leaving the war behind and avoiding to face up to the 
problems of the past. Based on this it might be reasonable to argue that the campaign of 
“healthy nationalism and internationalism”, together with the wave of Nihonjinron 
books, served to strengthen the problems of the confusing terms of nationalism and 
patriotism, by avoiding the issues at the core of the question of national consciousness.                               
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Chapter 4: Kimigayo and the imperial institution, the focus of much opposition 
     Education seems to be the area where the conflict regarding the so-called “healthy 
nationalism and internationalism” was the strongest.  The Ministry of Education, 
Monbushō and the Japan Teachers’ Union, Nikkyōso were the main opponents 
struggling over Hinomaru and Kimigayo, the most evident element of the political 
campaign within the field of education.  
     At the root of the problem of Hinomaru and particularly Kimigayo are the 
controversial position of the emperor and the question of whether a national anthem that 
praises the emperor’s reign is acceptable in a country, whose Constitution states that the 
emperor is a symbol of the state and of the unity of the people.104 
      Before addressing the question how the politics of so-called “healthy nationalism 
and internationalism” influenced the field of education, it is necessary to understand the 
symbols’ role in Japanese society in general and in the field of education in particular. 
Thus it is necessary to look at the historical context. The position of the emperor is at 
the root of the issue of Kimigayo. To get a clear understanding of the basis on which 
much opposition within the field of education is based, it is necessary to look into the 
establishment of this system, its influence on the field of education and the question of 
the emperor’s war responsibility. 
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                 The history of Hinomaru and Kimigayo  
    Kimigayo and Hinomaru have been used for a long time as the national anthem and 
flag of Japan. Based on a law of habit, they have often been referred to as such. When 
looking for Hinomaru and Kimigayo in the Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, the 
encyclopedia instead refers to articles on the national flag and anthem,105 even though 
neither of them has officially been recognized as such by law. 
                        
                                     Hinomaru  
 
     Hinomaru is said to symbolize the sun. Its name literally means “the circle of the 
sun”. It is not certain when it was used for the first time. Scholars are divided in their 
views on the historical background of both symbols,106 but some say it dates back to as 
early as the eight century. It has also been said that it was used during the Mongol 
invasions of Japan in the 13th century.107  
      The use of the flag in its current form dates back more than three hundred years. 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi used the flag in his invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1597. The 
ships of the Tokugawa shogunate also adopted it in the early seventeenth century.108 In 
the latter days of national isolation (1639-1854) in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), 
when trade and other contact with foreign countries increased, Shimazu Nariakira, the 
28th Lord of Satsuma domain, suggested that the flag should be used not only by the 
shogunate’s ships but also by all Japanese ships, in order to distinguish them from 
foreign ships.  
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     At first the shogunate rejected the proposal, but later, based on Nariakira’s 
suggestion, it decided that all Japanese ships should use the flag. The first ship that used 
Hinomaru to distinguish it as a Japanese ship was Shōheimaru of Satsuma in 1855.109 
    The Meiji Government was established in 1868. On January 27th and October 3rd 
1870 the Grand Council of the State issued Proclamations No. 57 and No. 6, which 
formally decided that Hinomaru should be used on Japanese merchant ships and on 
naval vessels.110   
    Based on these proclamations Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan in its 1983 article on 
the national flag claims “It was not until 27 January 1870, however, that the new Meiji 
government officially designated it as the national flag of Japan”. It does not say that 
the proclamations only concerned merchant ships and the navy. Thus the encyclopedia 
misinterprets the historical facts, and as such, it is a statement that shows to what extent 
the legal status of Hinomaru has been taken for granted.  
      In 1871 the Grand Council was reorganized; in 1885 a cabinet replaced it and its 
declarations were abolished.111 In 1931 a member of the Lower House suggested to 
legalize Hinomaru as the national flag, but the House of Peers rejected the bill.112 
     Though Hinomaru is associated with the war, it should be kept in mind that the use 
of the flag today and during and before the war in some cases is quite different. It was 
not the white and red rising sun flag (the flag to the right below), but the one that also 
includes sun’s rays that was used by the navy (the flag to the left below). 
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When it comes to the display of Hinomaru at entrance and graduation ceremonies, 
before the war the flag was hung at the front gate, while today in most cases it is used 
inside the school hall.113 
                    
          Kimigayo 
 
Though the lyrics of Kimigayo are very old, as a song in its present form, it dates 
from 1880 and is closely associated with the emperor. It is unknown who wrote the 
lyrics. It appears in the 10th century anthology Kokin wakashu, a collection of classical 
31-syllable waka poem. The original first line referred only to “My Lord” (Waga kimi 
wa). However in the 11th century anthology Wakan rôeishu it had changed to “My 
Lord’s Reign” (Kimi ga yo)114, which has been taken to mean the emperor. Before 1945 
this was the meaning taught in schools.115 
 In 1869 the British military band instructor Fenton asked whether Japan had a 
ceremonial national anthem. He offered to compose the music if somebody could 
provide the lyrics. Satsuma had played an important role in the Meiji restoration and 
Japan’s first military band was established by Satsuma domain in 1870. Their director 
Ōyama Iwao,116 who was himself from Satsuma, chose Kimigayo from Hôraisan, a 
Satsuma-biwauta (lute- song). Fenton composed the music, which was played for the 
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first time during an army parade on September 18th, 1870 by the Satsuma military band, 
which had studied music in Yokohama under the guidance of Fenton.117 
 In 1876 it was proposed to rewrite the music of Kimigayo and to compose music that 
reflected the style of the musical chants performed at the imperial court. The task was 
entrusted to the Imperial Household Ministry.118 In 1880 among others Hayashi 
Hiromori and the German composer Eckert were appointed to compose a new 
melody.119 Hayashi wrote the melody that is today known as Hinomaru and Eckert 
brought the music into consonance.120 It was performed for the first time at the 
emperor’s birthday on November 3rd, 1880 at the imperial palace.121  
Furthermore, in 1891 the elementary school rules for national holidays and festival 
days listed Kimigayo as an appropriate song to use on such days.122 The rules 
established the worship of the portrait of the emperor and the reverent reading of the 
imperial rescript on education.123 Finally in 1893 Kimigayo was included as one of the 
songs to be sung on such special days.124 Thus Kimigayo became closely linked not 
only with schools but was also associated with the emperor and values such as loyalty 
and patriotism.125 
  Though the China and Russia wars (1894-95 and 1904-05) strengthened the position 
of Kimigayo, there was also criticism against it. Osaka Asahi Shinbun said in 1904 that 
it was the imperial family’s song, not a state song.126 However, as state control of 
schools and society in general became strong during the 1930s and 40s, Kimigayo came 
to be treated as the national anthem, though the only time it was actually referred to as 
such was in a textbook on ethics in 1937.127 
  Thus Kimigayo and Hinomaru have been used for a long time as the national 
anthem and flag of Japan. Most countries have written laws128 specifying their national 
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flag and anthem, but in Japan both have been a matter of habit. There has been no 
additional law until the symbols were hastily acknowledged as the national flag and 
anthem by the Diet on the 9th of August 1999. 
 For some people the symbols are associated with World War II. In 2000, 35 percent 
answered that they sympathize with people who oppose Hinomaru and Kimigayo 
because they made them think of the war and the prewar period. 56 percent said that 
they did not.129 It is mostly because of the lyrics of Kimigayo that opposition remains 
strong. This was also confirmed by a 1978 opinion poll, when 65,2 percent of those who 
did not find Kimigayo appropriate as “the national anthem”, said the lyrics are not 
appropriate.
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           The imperial institution and the process of creating a national identity  
  The position of the emperor is at the root of the issue of Kimigayo. Today, the imperial 
institution is the symbol of modern Japan based on its democratic constitution of 1947. 
Though the lyrics that praise the emperor and hope his reign will last forever are very old, as a 
national symbol, Kimigayo is closely associated with the imperial institution and dates from 
the Meiji period (1868-1912). Based on the Constitution of 1889, which had the imperial 
institution at its center, the Meiji period represented a political system that had contradictory 
elements of both constitutional and absolute monarchy. At the core of the problem of 
Kimigayo is therefore the system the imperial institution represented.  
Prior to the Restoration in 1868 the role of the Japanese emperor had been vague. As 
Sandra Wilson explains, the  
“nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century,…though crucial to the overthrow of the 
Tokugawa regime and the establishment of the Meiji nation-state, was by and large the 
nationalism of a small elite.” As such “it was greatly overshadowed at that time by 
more local loyalties – to villages or to domains, rather than to any 'national entity'”.130  
  
 After the Meiji Restoration, the political leaders of Japan faced two rather contradictory 
tasks. “One was the legitimation of political rule by strengthening the imperial institution; the 
other was rapid Westernization to ensure national independence.”131 
 National identity had yet to be created and implanted among the people. In this process the 
institution of the emperor was useful. During the Meiji era the emperor became the 
ideological center of the Japanese nation and it was therefore necessary to make him familiar 
to the population. The political leaders set out to make the emperor known as the central 
institution of government, a process in many ways completed by the time of the promulgation 
of the constitution.132 When Emperor Meiji died in 1912, the role of the emperor was 
surrounded by an aura of symbols that "held its power through to the end of the Second World 
War."133  
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"The institution of the emperor constituted the main pillar of the Meiji political 
system. It was the single most effective instrument employed by the ruling elite to retain 
their authority. The transformation of the imperial court from an empty institution, 
virtually unknown to the masses during the Tokugawa era, into an institution that 
claimed unquestioned, absolute sovereignty was one of the key achievements of the 
Meiji leaders."134 
 
During the Tokugawa era, the people knew the shogunate, but their knowledge of the 
existence of the emperor was vague.135 He was sent on travels to make his people acquainted 
with him. While the Tokugawa emperors (1603-1868) made only 3 travels, from 1868 to 1912 
Emperor Meiji made 102 travels, of which 70 took place before the promulgation of the 
constitution.136 
Though it was written by, among others, Itō Hirobumi137, the constitution, was promulgated 
as the gift of the emperor in 1889.138 It came into force on November 11th 1890.139 Among the 
oligarch leaders there was a general distrust towards political parties and it was feared that the 
imperial institution would fall under the control of the politicians.  
In a famous speech in 1888 Itō defended the imperial institution as the axis of the nation 
against the power of the party politicians.140 However, Itō said contradictory things regarding 
the aim of the constitution.141 It therefore seems reasonable to argue that 
"The Meiji Constitution was essentially an attempt to unite two concept
which…were irreconcilable: Imperial absolutism and popular governmen
s 
2 t."14
 
The first paragraph spoke of the imperial house as a "line unbroken for ages eternal" and 
placed the emperor at its core.143 He was the sovereign of the nation and the descendant of the 
Sun Goddess;144 a principle agreed upon even by those whose point of view of politics was a 
secular one.145 The constitution stated that it was established by the emperor; he was the only 
one who could change it. It was a code of laws that would be in effect forever. It was not 
changed once as long as it existed.146 
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 The constitution had elements of constitutional and absolute monarchy. It contained major 
contradictions and has been described as apparent constitutionalism.147 A feature of 
constitutional monarchy was the existence of the Imperial Parliament. However, the 
government was responsible to the emperor and the important advisory organ the Privy 
Council was appointed by the emperor.  
 The army and navy ministers were responsible directly to the emperor, not the Prime 
Minister.148 Both the emperor and the House of Peers had the power to veto the Lower House, 
which though its influence was limited, had to approve tax bills. As the armed forces 
demanded more money, the opposition exercised some power when the governments turned 
to it for money through taxes. 
 After the promulgation the emperor became a figure remote from the people. In the early 
years, he traveled to be seen. Where the crowds used to wait to see him, they were now kept 
away and public appearance was limited to events such as military parades.149 In 1888 he was 
photographed150 and his portrait was used in schools, public buildings and on money. His 
image "replaced his person before the public",151 and he was “more fully public property than 
he had ever been before.”152  
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                The imperial institution and the education system 
 
 In Meiji efforts were made to create and implant a feeling of national identity to strengthen 
the state. The imperial institution was an important tool in this process, which was also 
evident within the pre-war education system and which has formed the basis for protests 
against government control of education in postwar Japan. In the Meiji period Japan’s 
progress was linked to the emperor and emphasized in schools. But, it was not until the        
"severe and rigid ideological control of the 1930s"153 that the state was able to control fully 
the teachers. 
   Education policy in early Meiji went through several changes, which is hardly surprising 
considering the rather conflicting goals of strengthening the emperor to legitimize political 
rule, and westernizing the country to maintain its independence. After years of catching up 
with the West a reaction set in. The government embarked on the control of education in order 
to suppress liberal movements.154 Motoda Eifu, a palace official and Confucian tutor to the 
Emperor, criticized the extreme western focus and emphasized the need to focus on the 
emperor as the source of moral authority, the ancestral imperial tradition and Confucian 
morality with loyal and filial subjects at its core.155 
 The instructions on education in 1879 made ethics, the least important subject, the core.156 
However, the revival of Confucianism was criticized by among others Fukuzawa Yukichi and 
Mori Arinori. When the latter became Minister of Education in 1885, he aimed at a Western-
style education system.157 
   In 1890 a Governor Conference on education argued that knowledge had been promoted 
at the expense of moral education. 158 It also criticized the involvement of youth in politics, 
probably the real reason for concern. Prime Minister Yamagata ordered Monbushō to draw up 
a statement defining the basic aims of education.159 The imperial rescript on education was the 
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result of cooperation between, among others, Motoda Eifu and Inoue Kowashi, and was 
promulgated on October 30th 1890.160 It was seen by the postwar US occupation rule as a tool 
of imperialism.  
   It stated that the source of the “kokutai”, Japan’s unique national polity, and of education 
was the relationship between Amaterasu and the other imperial ancestors, who established 
Japan, and the subjects.161 The subjects were asked to cultivate virtues, such as chū, loyalty, 
and kō, filial piety. In addition the rescript pointed at the importance of respecting the 
Constitution and laws, values of a modern state. “At the same time, by presenting the 
principles of education as eternal truths, it pretends to be an apolitical document.”162 
 Education policy had settled “in one word, on our kokutai”,163 which refers directly to the 
imperial dynasty as the center of the Japanese state and to a fictive bond between the people 
and the emperor as the father of the people. At the time Confucianism was associated with the 
feudal past and therefore had negative connotations. Therefore Inoue minimized the 
Confucian connection. The word itself did not appear in the rescript and its virtues were 
welcomed as the Japanese way.164 
 Monbushō selected the distinguished ideologue Inoue Tetsujirō to write a comment on the 
rescript for use in schools. Though the word patriotism did not appear in the rescript, Inoue 
“linked Confucian virtues with ‘collective patriotism,’ thus making patriotism…the sum 
meaning of the moral text.”165  
    Ueno Chizuko argues that the order of the Confucian virtues chū and kō was turned upside 
down in the Meiji period to strengthen the position of the emperor.166 Traditionally kō, filial 
piety towards the parents was more important than chū, loyalty towards a feudal lord. Thus 
the possibility of conflict existed.167 However, in Inoue’s 1891 “Interpretation of the Rescript” 
and his 1908 “Ethics and Education” it is claimed that chū and kō are the same, and loyalty 
towards the emperor is stressed at the expense of filial piety.168 
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“If the spirit, which expresses filial piety to the head of the family is extended to 
the whole nation, this is exactly the same as loyalty towards the emperor.”169  
e 
t 
  
 
Since the emperor is the head of the Japanese people, one must exercise chū towards the 
emperor in the same manner, as it is one’s duty to exercise chū towards the head of the 
family. 170 To Ueno this is a trick achieved during the establishing process of the rescript. 
Throughout the 1890s and the 1900s Monbushō worked to establish control. It was easier to 
include the rescript in school ceremonies than in the curriculum.171 Ideologically unreliable 
teachers were a problem. In 1908 only 26 percent of teachers were graduates of the strict 
training of national teacher schools.172 The efficiency of the rescript and to what extent the 
pupils –and the teachers – understood it should be questioned. In 1912 a journalist wrote, 
”though the Rescript on Education is known and memorized throughout th
country, it is only mouthed. Even the educators recite it like a sutra withou
understanding its meaning.”173
  
 The most dramatic increase in imperial exposure occurred during the two Meiji wars.174 
The media stressed the emperor’s role as the Commander-in-Chief, while he in peacetime 
disappeared from the headlines.175 
 Monbushō struggled to establish control with limited success. It was said, “schools at the 
end of the Meiji period were places of instruction, not indoctrination.”176 The situation 
continued to be quite liberal in the 1910s and 20s. It was not until the 30s the state “was able 
to suppress the diverse intellectual and political enthusiasms of its teachers”177 and control 
became more complete. 
 In the 30s schools stressed loyalty to the emperor and defense of the nation as important 
ideals. Until the outbreak of and during World War II education became gradually more 
militaristic and jingoistic.178 This formed the basis for the postwar struggle regarding the 
emperor symbolism with Kimigayo, as an expression of the teacher unions’ strong resistance 
towards government control of the field of education.  
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               The imperial institution and the question of war responsibility 
    
     The imperial institution was caught in a position where major groups of power could 
manipulate it. However, the war was fought in its name, which became an important reason 
for the controversy regarding the emperor’s war responsibility – and Kimigayo. 
     Critics of the Shwōa emperor such as Bergamini, Inoue and Bix see the emperor as an 
absolute monarch. While ignoring the restraints on the emperor’s influence that the different 
forces of power could constitute, Bix179 holds him responsible for Japan's warfare. Large, 
however, emphasizes that the emperor saw himself as a constitutional monarch. Contradictory 
concepts of absolute and limited monarchy in the constitution, contributed to a situation 
where the emperor  
“was an absolute monarch to the people, but within the ruling class he was treated in terms 
of tacit understanding…that he was a constitutional monarch.”180  
e 
f-
e 
5  
    
    Critics see a 1929 incident, when the government stepped down as the result of the 
emperor’s criticism, and the emperor’s opposition to a 1936 military coup attempt as proof of 
the emperor’s influence, and argue that he could have prevented the war.  
 When Japanese officers murdered the warlord of Manchuria in 1936,181 the emperor 
wanted a military trial.182 However, the army resisted and put pressure on Prime Minister 
Tanaka, who gave in. When reporting to the emperor, he “interpreted the Emperor’s words as 
meaning he should resign.”183 Large argues the emperor felt he overstepped the limits of a 
constitutional monarch and that this influenced the emperor to put restraints on himself. 184 
“This form of ‘internal constraint’… would not itself prove decisive in enabling th
military to have their own way in early Shōwa Japan. Yet there is no doubt that the sel
induced neutrality of the court contributed to the weakening of the resistance to th
military.”18
   
     Prior to the 1936 coup attempt the armed forces gradually became more influential. 
Minobe, a leading expert on law was criticized for his Organ Theory, published almost thirty 
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years earlier. It saw the emperor as an organ within the state, not above it.186 Radical militarist 
preferred  
“an absolutist interpretation that would permit them to exercise power on behalf of th
Emperor, whom they claimed to represent directly under the provision of the 
”independence of the sup
e 
e command.”187  rem
    
    The incident meant the end of freedom of thought188 and strengthened rivalry within the 
army189 between Kōdō-ha consisting of younger officers and Tōsei-ha, a group headed by 
generals. Kōdō-ha officers staged a coup in 1936.190 Their success depended on whether the 
army leaders would support them. Before hesitating generals made up their mind, the emperor 
ordered the crushing of the coup.191 
 To Inoue Kiyoshi the incident showed that if the emperor wanted to control the army, he 
could. Thus he should have been able to prevent the war. The reason why he did not, 
according to Inoue, was because he did not disagree with the army.192 However, the emperor 
did not crush the coup on his own. What became decisive was that he made it clear he was 
against the coup. The emperor later stated he had overstepped his bounds as a constitutional 
monarch.193  
Ironically, the coup meant a strengthening of the military. Many Kōdō-ha officers were 
removed.194 The power of Tōsei-ha after the coup was much stronger than the power of Kōdō-
ha had been. Its “threat to the constitutional order was more severe since its activities 
appeared legal…”195 By trying to use the constitution’s theory regarding an absolute monarch 
in order to carry out its own policy, Tōsei-ha was a threat to the constitution.196  
     It seems the emperor had two alternatives.197 He could defend the constitutional monarchy 
by overstepping his role. This could cause military resistance and the end of constitutional 
monarchy. The second option was to act as a constitutional monarch and approve of politics 
and laws. However, he would risk playing into the hands of those who wanted to subdue the 
constitutional monarchy by claiming to act on behalf of an absolute monarch.  
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  The emperor chose the second option,198 for which he has been much criticized. Large 
criticizes the emperor for being to passive after the coup but suggests the emperor’s belief in 
his role as a constitutional monarch was decisive.199  
     During the war the emperor encouraged Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, to end it if 
possible.200 However, the question of whether he delayed the surrender is debatable.201 After 
the atomic bombings, on the request of the Prime Minister, the emperor intervened to make 
army leaders surrender.202  
    Critics say that if the emperor could take part in ending the war, he should have been able 
to prevent it. However, the situation was different in 1945. The armed forces were much 
weaker and the economy had collapsed. Though the emperor supported the negotiations with 
the US in order to try to avoid war, his influence was limited because of his isolated 
position.203 It was the government, not the emperor that decided upon war,204 and though he, 
like many others, both within Japan and in the US - is to blame for not doing more, it seems 
unlikely he in could have prevented the war in 1941. 
   The International Military Tribunal for the Far East held a few leaders responsible. 
However, not only the military but also the vast majority of the population was “completely 
behind the decision for war”205 and media and members of parliament supported war.  
  “In so far as the Diet members speak at all, they are so belligerent that the government appears 
moderate by comparison.”206  
   
    By 1941, the Japanese population had become a “war-minded people who believed in the 
justice of their cause”.207 It seemed the effects of official brainwashing were now visible, 
affecting the leaders as well as the population, and that it would be very hard for the leaders to 
avoid a war; 
“the people would never have permitted them to accept a de facto defeat by agreeing 
to the terms that had been submitted by the United States. They had become the slaves of 
their own creation.”208 
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   With principles of democracy in mind Japan has often been judged for waging an aggressive 
war. However, it should be kept in mind that Japan after the forced opening of the country, 
acquired as much knowledge as it could and then set out to establish colonies of its own, as 
the colonial powers had already done. Thus, “in addressing the question of the emperor's war 
responsibility, one must distinguish between legalistic assumption in the postwar West and 
emperor's responsibilities in prewar Japan.”209 
After the war Japan and the emperor have been exposed to vehement criticism concerning 
Japanese warfare and the inhuman war crimes caused by Japanese troops in the areas they 
occupied. It is impossible to defend or even explain the war crimes, however, the question 
should be asked whether it is too simplistic to condemn the war itself as an aggressive war of 
nationalistic imperialism.  
     It seems the view of history normally presented is the view of the victorious side, 
influenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). Though the 
Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, which published a history textbook leaving 
out negative aspects, questioned this view of history in an extreme way, the issue seems to be 
avoided by more moderate circles. It might be out of fear that criticism would be linked to 
prewar ultra- nationalism, that moderates tend to avoid the issue. In the case of the emperor’s 
responsibility it is a crucial question. Much criticism of the emperor, also in Japan, is based on 
the US view of history, which seems to be too simplistic. 210  
The history taught to US pupils and often conveyed through Hollywood films, normally 
stresses the “surprise attack” on Pearl Harbor. Though the war itself was not a surprise and the 
relationship between Japan and the US gradually changed to negative feelings, a survey of US 
college world history texts concluded that some of the texts 
“totally blamed Japanese ‘aggression’ for World War II. They ignored the problems that 
Japan faced in the 1930s and the role that the West in general and the United States in particular 
played in creating them. The statements about Japanese ‘aggression’ supplemented by Pearl 
Harbor pictures usually ignored such things as the Triple Intervention, Wilson’s veto of the 
Racial Equality Clause at Versailles, the tariff disputes, and the 5-5-3 disarmament problem.”211  
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     The question of guilt is more complex than is often acknowledged by critics, who claim 
the IMTFE should have charged the emperor. Had he been charged, he would most likely 
have been convicted, the presumption was of guilt, not innocence.212 
     Both the charter of the Tokyo and the Nuremberg trials were based on a 1945 London 
conference, charging the leaders of Germany and Japan “not simply with conventional war 
crimes, but crimes against peace and against humanity”213 and for launching a war of 
aggression.  
     The problem was that international law was not clear. The London conference record was 
“a fascinating document, for the Allies found it very difficult to agree even among themselves 
as to what constituted international law”.214 They proposed to prosecute actions they 
themselves conceded were not crimes under international law.215 Accordingly the prosecution 
was freed “from the necessity of demonstrating that questionable acts were in fact violations 
of established law.”216  
     The IMTFE only dealt with Japanese war crimes.217 Minear see the atomic bombs as 
examples of “crimes against humanity” and Soviet Union's declaration of war against Japan 
despite the existence of a neutrality pact, as an example of “crime against peace”. One 
definition for the Allies and one for Japan “may be good politics; but they are bad justice. 
Either all are guilty, or none.”218  
     The tribunal dealt with the issue of negative criminality or the disregard of the “legal duty 
to take adequate steps…to prevent breaches”219 of laws of war. Minear discusses whether 
such a crime existed before international law, but morally the question whether the emperor is 
accountable for acts of omission in failing to prevent the war is important. Could he have 
done more? As Large says, “this question is as difficult to answer as it is necessary to ask.”220   
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“Hirohito was clearly no pacifist. Rather, he was a nationalist determined to preserve the 
empire he had inherited, and when Japan went to war, he naturally did everything he could to 
make sure that it would prevail.”221 
    
    Though it seems unlikely the emperor could have prevented the war in 1941, “in the view 
of the terrible consequences of the war fought in his name”222 he is to blame for not making 
more efforts. 
Whether the emperor should have stepped down is a difficult question. It seems the 
emperor remaining has had serious consequences. The emperor not being tried as a war 
criminal has to a certain extent “permitted the Japanese people to escape their own historical 
accountability for war.”223 Since the war was fought in the name of the emperor, his moral 
responsibility is beyond question to many Japanese, contributing to the controversy regarding 
the imperial institution and Kimigayo. To some the  
“question has been subsumed into the more basic and complex issue of whether the 
Japanese people as a whole were also historically responsible for war.”224 “Many 
Japanese…came to feel that because the emperor had not been held responsible, neither should 
they.”225 
   
    As a result there has been no balanced discussion where it was possible to be both self-
critical and critical of the view of history and the settling of the guilt issue presented by the 
US and the IMTFE. The emperor remaining made it easier to ignore the war and to bury it 
under a mountain of taboos, where conservatives could ignore it. Accordingly this is the basis 
for much of the controversy both in society in general and within the postwar field of 
education concerning the political campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and 
internationalism”.  
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Chapter 5: “Healthy nationalism and internationalism” and its influence on education: 
Monbushō and Nikkyōso 
     It seems it was within the field of education the struggle regarding the occurrence of so-
called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was strongest, with the controversy of 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the most evident problem. As Yoshino Kosaku puts it, “Education 
is one of the social areas in which conflicts between the restraints on nationalism and 
reactions against such restraints have been particularly evident.”226  
     Scholars do not agree who is responsible for the fact that the political ideology concerning 
“healthy nationalism and internationalism” became one of the key areas of the debate on 
education reform.227 To Hood, a supporter of Nakasone, this is clearly Nakasone’s 
“achievement”, while Schoppa228credits the somewhat doubtful honor to Monbushō and the 
LDP education zoku.229 
     Hood and Schoppa do not agree on the success of Rinkyōshin at implementing its 
suggestions. Schoppa see Rinkyōshin as even less successful than the 1971 attempt. He says 
that in 1971 the reformers were “able to at least put together a substantive reform package – 
failing mostly in the implementation stage – the Ad Hoc Council did not even get that far”,230 
because they simply could not agree. Hood argues that this conclusion is premature: “In terms 
of achieving long-term goals for the education reform and social reform, I do not think that 
things could have worked out better for Nakasone.”231 
     What remains a fact is that the politics of “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was 
an area where the conservative forces were mainly in agreement, thus increasing the chances 
for its implementation. Whether the Ministry or the education zoku should take the credit – or 
the blame – rather then Nakasone, for making it a key area in the debate on education reform 
is hard to determine. However, it cannot be denied that this is a way of thinking that has been 
strongly promoted by and connected with Nakasone. 
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“Nakasone’s contribution was to make …[issues of education] the focus of national 
political discourse by making education reform, for the first time, a major plank of the LDP’s 
political and electoral strategy.”232   
    
     In connection with the establishment of Rinkyōshin Nakasone stated that the goal of the 
education reform was to revise the postwar education system and to create “international 
Japanese”.233 Rinkyōshin adopted Nakasone’s view concerning “healthy nationalism and 
internationalism”, which its 1987 report showed: 
“From now it is necessary that our country [Japan] while having a deep understanding, respect 
and affection for Japanese culture as well as having an extensive understanding of and being 
tolerant toward other cultures, at the same time as playing a positive, international role, strives to 
achieve international trust…Together with education that deeply recognizes that a good world 
citizen is a good Japanese and raises a heart that loves [Japan], education that deepens the 
understanding of all foreign countries’ culture, traditions etc. must be established.”234 
    
     The emperor served as a tool within this process in order to restore Japanese pride.  
“Nakasone sought to stimulate popular support for his ‘grand design’ by stressing the 
importance of the monarchy to the people.” 235 Nakasone clearly linked Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo to the emperor when he stated in 1987:  
“The emperor is something like the sun shining in the heavens. That is why there is respect for 
Japan. Centered on the emperor Japan contributes to the world. Therefore we must teach these 
national traditions through education. That is why we have such national symbols as the national 
flag and the national anthem.”236 
   
    Based on the Rinkyōshin reports the education guidelines were revised in 1989,237 making 
use of the symbols at entrance and graduation ceremonies compulsory as in “must be done”, 
instead of merely “desirable”.238 This indicates that also the Ministry embraced Nakasone’s 
view, and it shows that the campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” 
clearly had an impact on education politics.   
   The phrase to “raise a heart that loves the country”, other phrases stressing love for Japan 
and words such as ‘kokusaika’ or ‘internationalization’ have become integrated parts of the 
guidelines. Furthermore, the wordings used by politicians such as Nakasone, stressing that in 
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order to respect other countries and be international, it is first necessary to love one’s own 
country, have become a part of the guidelines and tend to be used when discussing the topic 
of Hinomaru and Kimigayo.239 
    Though the attention regarding the symbols of Hinomaru and Kimigayo intensified as a 
result of the politics promoted in the mid-80s, it should be noted that the issue had been 
addressed several times since the end of the war. After the war Hinomaru was forbidden240 
but not Kimigayo.241 The ban was lifted in 1949. It had not been total; if individuals applied 
for permission it was sometimes granted, as was also the case regarding public holidays.242 In 
the still occupied Okinawa Hinomaru was allowed from January 1953.243 Around this time 
NHK started to play Kimigayo and display Hinomaru at the end of programs, and the symbols 
were used at professional baseball games and at sumō tournaments.244  
    It is interesting to note that an Asahi Shimbun opinion poll, conducted after the ban was 
lifted, showed that even though as many as 73 percent of the household asked still possessed 
the flag, – during the war the hoisting had been compulsory- less than 20 percent hoisted 
Hinomaru on public holidays. Rather than opposition towards the flag, indifference seemed to 
be the reason.245                                                                                                                                         
 In 1950 Monbushō minister Amano stated that the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo on 
public holidays was desirable.246 In 1958 Monbushō for the first time included the use of 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo in a revision of its guidelines:  
“On national holidays and on ceremonial occasions etc, as well as enabling children to 
understand their significance, it is desirable to hoist the national flag and to sing Kimigayo.” 247  
  
    Only Hinomaru was referred to as the national flag, while Kimigayo simply remained 
Kimigayo. Though Monbushō admitted there was no legal base for using the terms national 
flag and anthem, there was no major counterattack. Senda suggests Nikkyōso, caught up in 
the struggle against the renewal of the US Japan Security Treaty, did not recognize the 
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problem as a major one yet.248 The struggle to prevent the conservative forces’ efforts to 
increase patriotism was focused on school subjects.249 However, from the mid 1970s the focus 
on Hinomaru and Kimigayo became stronger, as attempts to increase patriotism intensified. 
    In 1974 Prime Minister Tanaka suggested not only to legalize Hinomaru and Kimigayo,250 
but also to revive the imperial rescript on education.251 The 1977 Monbushō guidelines for the 
first time referred to Kimigayo as the national anthem, 252 but what really caused “turmoil 
among educators”253 was the instructions issued by Monbushō in 1985 to all school heads to 
hoist the national flag and make the children sing the national anthem. Thus the 1989 
guidelines, which finally made use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at entrance and graduation 
ceremonies mandatory, was the result of a long process.   
    The success of Ministry guidelines always depends on the response they encounter in the 
schools, where the teachers had a history of persistently trying to sabotage the authorities’ 
initiatives. The Hinomaru and Kimigayo issue was particularly important in the struggle 
between Monbushō and Nikkyōsō,254 which was – at least at the national level – one of the 
strongest conflicts in postwar Japan.  
    Education politics in postwar Japan were about more than simply education politics. They 
were a conflict between left and right in Japanese politics, where the field of education 
functioned as a battlefield for politics in general: 
“Since Nikkyōsō has been the main force blocking LDP effort to re-establish pre-war patterns 
and reintroduce traditional Japanese values, it has naturally become a corollary of these policies 
that the union must first be weakened. Over the years, however, the suppression of the union has 
also become a goal in itself.”255    
   
     Consequently, when discussing how the politics of so-called “healthy nationalism and 
internationalism” influenced the field of education, one cannot avoid to place the Hinomaru 
and Kimigayo conflict within the context of the Monbushō vs. Nikkyōso struggle. Thus, it is 
necessary to discuss the education politics as a part of what seems to have been LDP’s 
permanent anti-union campaign and to ask to what extent the influence of the so-called 
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“healthy nationalism and internationalism” depended on this campaign. It might be that in 
order to increase what was presented as “patriotism” or “healthy nationalism”, a necessary 
pre-condition was to deal with Nikkyōso.  
                     
              The effects of anti-union politics 
      What were the authorities’ policies towards the union? It seems the education policy 
chosen by the authorities in the first postwar decades was based on a ‘smash the union’256 
strategy, which encouraged Nikkyōso to fight harder. When the US occupation ended in 1952, 
education became a key battleground in the conservative campaign to overturn occupation 
reforms.257  
     “In the process of resisting the reverse course, Nikkyōso came to involve itself in the wider 
struggle that was going on between the conservative government and its progressive 
opposition. ”258 This seems to have been the source of the anti-union element of LDP 
education policy. The period from 1952 to the early 1960s was a time with strong 
confrontations, such as the US Japan Security Treaty.  
      The struggles involved hundreds of mass demonstrations and riots and earned Nikkyōso 
the bitter enmity of the government. Appealing to the people’s desire for peace, however, the 
struggles had broader support from the general public. However, the political struggles were 
often far from the lives of ordinary members. This resulted in a gap between leaders and 
members.259 
    Immediately after the war, the political climate had been favorable for the left-wing unions. 
Major changes took place within the field of education. To decentralize the education system 
and weaken Monbushō control the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) carried 
out extensive reforms.260 History, geography and shūshin were abolished in 1945. The Far 
East Committee forbade the use of the imperial rescript on education, but it took more than 
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one year before the Parliament decided to invalidate the rescript. Thus two pillars of pre-war 
education disappeared from the educational stage.261 
      In addition books were changed, references to Shinto forbidden, Monbushō power 
reduced through the public election of school boards, and schools could freely choose 
textbooks. As noted, the use of Hinomaru, but not of Kimigayo, was forbidden. Furthermore, 
the Fundamental Law on Education, based on democratic values, was passed in 1947.262 
However, it is interesting to note that the general interest in the law was low because of more 
everyday life problems such as starvation and the general confusion after the war. The 
teachers’ union, founded in 1945, also focused on the need to improve the living conditions of 
the teachers. Many Marxists teachers were critical of the law because of its US connotations 
and saw it as the democracy of the bourgeois. They argued that it would not lead to social 
revolution.263 
   Nikkyōso was formed in 1947264 when two teachers’ unions, a radical one with 
communists and quite radical socialists among its members, another more moderate one with 
less radical socialists as members, joined forces as a result of the occupation force’s change of 
policy due to the Cold War and the Korean War.265 It was estimated that by the autumn of 
1947, 446 000, or 98 percent of the elementary school teachers had joined it.266  
     However, the situation was paradoxical with radical leaders, but mainly moderate 
members.  A reason why teachers in a desperate economic situation267 chose to follow such 
leaders was in the words of Thurston: 
   “Psychologically shattered by the total failure of the prewar Emperor-centered ideology, 
these ordinary teachers were disillusioned with the militaristic government and those forces in 
the society which had misled the country into the disastrous war; they were ready to join 
organizations that would represent their protests and their denunciation of the past.”268 
   
   The SCAP policies encouraged the union. SCAP ordered the removal of all teachers 
“known to be militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, or antagonistic to the objectives and the policies 
of the Occupation.”269 By May 1947, 120 000 teachers or 22 percent of all teachers, had been 
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removed. Many chose to retire rather than to become the subject of purge.270  However, in 
1947 the situation changed. The purge changed to a purge of left-wing teachers. As a result of 
the “red purge” that started in 1949, 1700 teachers were fired because of their political 
views.271 
  “The honeymoon in relations between the American authorities and the left-wing teachers’ 
organizations was now at an end, but it had lasted long enough to allow those organizations to 
expand their membership dramatically. The left-wing leaders exploited to the full the first period 
in Japanese history when they were allowed, without any restrictions or interference, to 
organize, publish and recruit.”272 
  
     The teachers lost the right to strike and Nikkyōso lost the right to negotiate on the national 
level, which seriously weakened the union’s influence since decisions on education policy are 
mainly made at the national level in Japan.273 Though there were conflicts about politics, “it 
has been in the field of education where [Nikkyōso] has fought its fiercest struggles.”274 
     School subjects and “patriotism” became struggles that did not ease the tension. It was 
argued that the learning ability of the pupils was decreasing. Social studies, the replacement 
of shūshin, history and geography, was listed as a reason because it did away with traditional 
learning methods. The necessity to revive history, geography and shūshin was argued. 
Prominent politicians, among them Prime Minister Yoshida and the Minister of Education, 
spoke of the need to stress education of patriotism through geography and history,275 which 
had been reestablished in 1946.276  
     The Fundamental Law on Education was also criticized because it did not foster love for 
the fatherland.277 Conservative politicians were not the only ones to criticize the new subjects. 
Also Marxists argued that Japanese history and geography were being ignored. However, 
Marxist criticism was based on opposition towards what was seen as Japan becoming a US 
colony.278  
      Despite resistance from Nikkyōso and the Socialist Party, Monbushō succeeded in 
reviving shūshin. One hour of moral education a week in elementary and junior high schools 
was required according to the 1958 revision of the guidelines on education.279 
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     A law was established forbidding the political activities of teachers. The public election of 
school boards was abolished by the Diet in 1956. 280 Before, one third of the members of such 
boards were Nikkyōso members. After the authorities appointed the members, the percentage 
dropped to 11.281 In addition Monbushō strengthened its control of textbooks. After the war 
anyone had the right to write textbooks and the teachers could chose among the books 
approved. The approval was merely a formality. But in 1956 a bill that would strengthen the 
ministry’s control was suggested. Opposition was strong not only from the teachers but also 
from the JSP and the press. The government withdrew the bill, but Monbushō approval of 
textbooks became stricter and the prefectural boards of education chose the only textbook to 
be used throughout the prefecture.282  
     When a teacher rating system was established in the late 1950s,283 new demonstrations and 
strikes emerged. The system was supposed to rate the efficiency of the teachers, but Nikkyōso 
claimed it was used to purge teachers with certain political views. 112 teachers were fired, 
1018 degraded and 52 273 had their salary reduced as a result of the rating system.284  
      It is interesting to note that in this case the union in general had the support of the press. 
Even Yomiuri Shimbun,285 normally supportive of the authorities’ policies, urged Monbushō 
to meet and listen to the teachers. Asahi Shimbun286 argued that Monbushō by refusing to 
negotiate with Nikkyōso, left the prefectural boards of education in charge of dealing with 
difficult questions of education. 
  Though the union was not able to prevent the implementation of the rating system, 
Nikkyōso influenced the way it was carried out. Often teachers filled out the forms based on 
Nikkyōso guidelines, resulting in positive ratings. “Thus, concerning the rating system, it 
appears that the Ministry may have won the initial battle but lost the war.” This illustrates that 
Nikkyōso was far more successful in exerting pressure on educational policy at the prefectural 
and local levels than at the national level.287 
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   The question should be asked what were the results of the authorities’ ‘smash the union’ 
policy and the union’s resistance? Though the authorities were not able to pacify the union, 
statistics suggest that it had an impact. Since 1958, the percentage of members gradually 
declined from 86,3 percent in 1958 to 72,9 percent in 1964 and to 56, 2 percent in 1969. By 
1977 the percentage was 55,2, a fairly stable number, but by 1987 it had dropped again to 
48,5 percent.288 It seems the struggle had the “effect of slowly but surely wearing Nikkyōso 
down.”289 
  The period from 1958-1962 was a time of confrontations, while the late 60s was a period 
of wage struggles and in both periods the percentage dropped considerably. The 70s was a 
period of fewer confrontations and from 1969 to 1977 the percentage was quite stable. In the 
80s education policy became an area of major confrontations, and in the period from 1977 to 
1987 there was again a clear decline.  
  It seems many teachers, politically more moderate than the left-wing leaders, were less 
willing to stick to the union in times of open confrontation, which  
“had harmful consequences because it allowed Nikkyōso’s enemies to portray it as an 
organization dedicated to resisting government attempts to improve education….Because the 
most newsworthy events of this period always had Nikkyōso in the role of the opposition to 
change…the negative image was usually the more enduring one in the public eye.”290 
    
 Nikkyōso was not very successful in the various struggles. Despite fierce resistance against 
the authorities’ ‘smash the union’ policy – especially at the national level, not much was 
achieved. The union changed to a more moderate organization, which focused more on 
payment increases and less on ideology.       
     It seems that not only the union changed its tactics after the years of strong confrontation. 
While the authorities’ old ‘smash the union’ strategy “had encouraged Nikkyōso to fight 
harder, the new strategy sought to create incentives for teachers to cooperate.”291 
     Nikkyōso had fought to improve the salary of the teachers, a struggle that reached its peak 
between 1966 and 1969, when the membership percentage of the union dropped again. It 
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seems reasonable to assume that this was not because the teachers did not want increased 
salaries, but because of the unpleasantness that followed with the struggle.  In this period the 
ministry issued administrative punishment of as many as 240 000 teachers,292 many had their 
salaries reduced.   
        A reason why the situation with a political gap between the left-wing leaders and moderate 
members had functioned was the desperate economic situation after the war. However, the 
authorities changed their approach. A part of the new strategy was the implementation of the 
shunin-system, a controversial new salary bonus for department head-level teachers, which 
together with the general increase of teachers’ salaries was a part of the Chūkyōshin 
suggestions in 1971. The shunin system was seen as an attempt to divide the teachers and the 
result was strikes, but general increase of payment was welcomed.293 
      The shunin system was implemented294 and Nikkyōso achieved wage increases. However, 
the price turned out to be high. By the 1990s Japanese teachers were among the best paid in 
the world. “It seems that by achieving these levels of pay Nikkyōso has been a victim of its 
own success.”295 As the financial situation improved the teachers grew more a-political and 
thus the gap between the leaders and the ordinary members widened.  
   It seems the new strategy of the authorities was successful, because Nikkyōso was forced 
to change. Moderates suggested a revision of Nikkyōso politics, which provoked an 
ideological battle between left and right. “In other words, the union’s enemies not only 
benefited from its chronic, long-term decline in membership, but also from its attempts to find 
solutions to the crisis.”296  
     The weakness of Nikkyōso was visible even before the end of the occupation. Even though 
it is always referred to as a single, national union, it was an organization with independent 
prefectural unions, which sometimes choose to follow the instructions of the national leaders 
but often not. From the start there was rivalry between socialists and communists. Though the 
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late 1940s was the peak of communist influence, the rivalry remained and in the late 1980s it 
became a threat to the union’s existence, causing Nikkyōso to split in two in 1989.297  
 The conservative forces had served as a common enemy keeping Nikkyōso together. 
However, in the late 1980s298 Nikkyōso faced a bitter leadership fight and at the same time the 
difficult question of how to respond to the education reforms suggested by Rinkyōshin.  
  The union opposed the suggestions because of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo guidelines, 
influenced by the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism”. It also opposed the 
proposal of a one year long probationary employment and teaching program for new teachers, 
which was the main Rinkyōshin299 proposal concerning teachers, arguing that this would 
strengthen the authorities’ control over teachers and education in general.300 
  Though the factions agreed that they disagreed with Rinkyōshin’s proposals, they did not 
agree on how to express their disagreement.301 The left-wing faction favored open 
confrontation; the right-wing side feared this would cause further damage through the loss of 
members. 
      However, it was the discussion whether to join a new giant Japanese labor confederation, 
Rengō that turned out to be the crucial problem. Disagreements over Rinkyōshin and 
leadership conflicts could have been overcome by compromises. The question of Rengō was 
of a different character, and as such it turned out to be the main reason for the schism. 302  
  In 1987 Sōhyō and Dōmei, the two major Japanese union federations announced the merge 
to form one all-embracing federation, Rengō in 1989. Because the former was public and the 
latter was private, it was assumed “the influence of private sector union practice could be 
brought to bear on public sector unions.”303 Rengō’s expressed policy of non-striking, anti-
communism and the acceptance of Rinkyōshin suggestions, was unpopular with the left-wing 
factions of Nikkyōsō. Joining would make real opposition to the 1989 guidelines impossible.  
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Since Nikkyōso is not acknowledged at the national level, a decision to join had to be made 
by the individual prefectural unions, resulting in the 1989 annual conference of each 
prefectural union. A national conference was held in September the same year, and made the 
formal decision to join Rengō. However, opponents, who boycotted the national conference, 
established a rival national conference in November 1989, where the All Japan Council of 
Teachers and Staff Union, Zennihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai Kyōgikai (Zenkyō) was 
established.304 It affiliated itself with the labor confederation known as Zenrōren, the new 
JCP-supported alternative to Rengō.305 
  Some prefectural unions chose to follow Nikkyōso and joined Rengō, when it was 
established in November 1989;306 others joined forces with Zenkyō and Zenrōren. In as many 
as 23 prefectures the unions split in two.307 On March 26th 1991 Zenkyō merged with the 
national federation of senior high school teachers, Nikkōkyō, which had broken away from 
Nikkyōsō as early as in 1951, and formed the All Japan Teachers and Staff Union, Zennihon 
Kyōshokuin Kumiai (Zenkyō).308 
    The tendency was that there was more support for Nikkyōso; but there were differences 
from prefecture to prefecture. After the schism there were prefectures where Nikkyōso for a 
while ceased to exist. Later, the organization reestablished unions in those prefectures.309 In 
2002 Nikkyōso had local unions in all of Japan’s 47 prefectures, while Zenkyō had local 
unions in 31 prefectures.310  
     The revision of the guidelines in 1989 happened at a time when the teachers’ unions were 
seriously weakened as the result of a long lasting struggle against the conservative authorities, 
which lead an anti-union policy. Thus it seems reasonable to argue the weakening of 
Nikkyōso through the permanent anti-union politics cleared the way for the conservative 
forces’ eager promotion of the political campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and 
internationalism”. 
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             Chapter 6: “Healthy nationalism and internationalism” and the legalization 
     It seems the development described in the previous section made it easier for the 
authorities to implement the guidelines and that this is one of the reasons for the so-called 
truce between Nikkyōso and Monbushō in 1994. It is necessary to discuss the developments 
after the 1989 revision, asking to what extent “healthy nationalism and internationalism” 
served as a pillar for the law recognizing Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and 
anthem. 
      The 1989 guidelines311 were supposed to come into effect for elementary schools in the 
1992 school year and for junior high schools in 1993, but in fact the schools were made to 
carry them out from 1990.312 Pressure seems to have been a part of the tactics to make schools 
comply. To increase the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo the Ministry issued a directive, 
according to which teachers who did not follow the instructions, became the object of 
punishment.313  
  Another measure seemed to be the detailed Ministry polls published every year, showing 
to what extent the national symbols were used at entrance and graduation ceremonies both at 
the national and prefectural level, polls that have been conducted since the mid-80s. Prior to 
1989 more than 50 percent of the elementary and senior high schools did not comply with the 
Ministry’s guidelines. The figure for junior high schools was a little over 60 percent.314  
   The 1991 survey showed a general increase compared to 1990 and it seems clear that 
there was a connection between the guidelines, the increase of compliance and the 
instructions regarding punishment. It is interesting to note that Schoppa, who is largely critical 
regarding the success of the education reforms, in 1991 listed the teaching of respectful 
attitudes towards the national flag and anthem as a Rinkyōshin proposal that had been largely 
implemented or was likely to be implemented.315 
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      The 1991 national average316 showed that approximately 97 % of the elementary and 
junior high schools hoisted Hinomaru at both ceremonies, but the Kimigayo percentage was 
lower, varying between 80,4 % and 84,6 %. The numbers for senior high schools were lower. 
At graduation and entrance ceremonies 91,5 % and 91, 6 % hoisted the flag while the 
Kimigayo numbers were respectively 68,5 % and 69,5 %. 18 prefectures had 100 % 
compliance. However, there were still prefectural differences. Though the teachers’ unions 
were weakened, there was still resistance against the guidelines.  
     The 1991 survey revealed that for the first time school principals were punished if their 
schools did not hoist Hinomaru and sing Kimigayo. Throughout the country 125 school 
principals were reprimanded. 114 were from Kōchi prefecture, which had had the lowest 
percentages the previous year for elementary school graduation ceremonies. In 1990 only 33,5 
% of the elementary schools in Kōchi hoisted Hinomaru while 14,6 % sang Kimigayo. 
Accordingly special measurements were taken and although the numbers increased, they were 
still lower than national average.317 
   It was argued in connection with the 1991 survey that the percentages were obtained 
through pressure from the authorities;318 Nikkyōso saw it as the authorities’ use of force. 
Monbushō on the other hand, claimed that the increasing percentages showed that the 
guidelines were being understood.319  
     However, it should be pointed out that the focus on these surveys might have been out of 
proportion to the role the symbols actually played at school ceremonies. Monbushō seemed a 
little obsessed with the Hinomaru and Kimigayo percentages; it was the only ceremonial fact 
normally presented. At the national level, school ceremonies seemed to be about nothing but 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo, as a means of increasing “healthy nationalism”. However, to the 
children involved in local schools, human relations such as saying goodbye to their friends at 
the graduation ceremony, may have been the main focus – not Hinomaru and Kimigayo.320 
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      It is difficult to measure to what extent the ministry’s wishes were carried out in the 
schools. What the surveys revealed was that in someway or other the symbols were present, 
but they did not say in what way. There were numerous cases where the use of Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo was very different from what the authorities actually intended. 
      A ceremony took place where it was reported that the vice-principal sung Kimigayo alone 
accompanied by a tape recorder.321 There were also reports of “principals running the flag up 
a flagpole, leaving it there for a few seconds, and then pulling it down.”322 Students boycotted 
ceremonies because Hinomaru was displayed. At other ceremonies teachers and students 
remained seated while Kimigayo was sung. Furthermore, at many schools Hinomaru was not 
hung above the stage but hoisted at a remote flagpole well out of the view of the ceremony’s 
proceedings.323 Though they were the exception rather than the rule, there were also schools 
where alternative ceremonies without Hinomaru and Kimigayo were organized.324 
  The statistics differentiate between whether Kimigayo was sung or the melody was merely 
played. However, it does not say how many teachers and pupils sung the song, or if they sang 
enthusiastically or mumbled. Furthermore the question remains if the statistics can be trusted. 
With the Ministry’s strong interest regarding compliance to the guidelines in mind, there may 
have been cases where the local boards of education reported that the symbols where used, 
even though only a few people sung – or mumbled, Kimigayo.  
     Thus to argue as the Ministry did that the high percentages show that the guidelines are 
being understood, seems to be based more on a wish than on reality. The Ministry’s argument 
was also contradicted by the fact that since the mid-80s and throughout the 90s many teachers 
were punished for failing to comply with the guidelines.325 
 At Nikkyōso’s first post-schism national conferences in 1990 and 1991, though the slogans 
were softer, politics regarding Hinomaru, Kimigayo and the resistance against the new 
guidelines remained more or less the same.326 In 1992 Nikkyōso issued instructions to its 
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members on how to fight the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at ceremonies. Since the 1989 
revision numerous teachers became the object of warnings, reprimands, reduction of salaries 
and suspensions.327 
  At the same time the national decline of the teachers’ union membership did not stop. In 
1991 the percentage dropped under 60 percent for the first time. 59,3 % of Japan’s teachers 
were members of a teachers’ union. 328 While the numbers were stable for small unions, both 
Nikkyōso and Zenkyō experienced a decline. In 1991 35,2 % of Japanese teachers were 
members of Nikkyōso compared to 35,7 % in 1990. Zenkyō experienced an increase from 8,7 
% in 1990 to 10,7 % because of the merge with Nikkōkyō. However, the de facto membership 
declined.329 
  Throughout the 90s the decline continued, reaching an all time low in 2002, when 31% of 
the teachers were members of Nikkyōso, while 8,2 % were members of Zenkyō. 49, 2 % were 
not members of any union at all.330 The continued decline probably reduced the ability to 
resist the authorities’ efforts to implement the guidelines. 
 The formation of a coalition government in June 94 that made SDP Chairman Murayama 
Japan's first socialist prime minister in 47 years, would probably not have happened had it not 
been for the fall of the LDP-dominated 1955 system, under which the LDP had been the sole 
party of government. To form a government the SDP had to consider its traditional Hinomaru 
and Kimigayo opposition.  
 Nikkyōso policy towards Hinomaru, Kimigayo and the guidelines remained more or less 
the same. However, Adachi argues that without Nikkyōso’s adoption of a more flexible 
approach since 1990, it would not have been possible for Murayama to comment as he did 
after resuming office:  
“Hinomaru and Kimigayo are established as the national flag and the national anthem, and I 
would like to respect that. However, the hoisting and singing should not be forced.”331 
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  Though Nikkyōso was clearly weakened after the schism – it had lost about one third of its 
members – it was free to follow a more moderate line of politics. A committee, which was 
given the task of hammering out proposals on how to reform the education system and the 
union in the post Cold War world, was established in April 94. It was named the 21st Century 
Vision Committee.332  
  It published its final report one year later. Some of the revisions such as a more flexible 
approach regarding the teachers training program and the shunin system contradicted existing 
policies.333 Despite heated discussions Nikkyōso policy was changed to comply with the 
committee suggestions at the national conference in 1995, which the mass media referred to 
as a historical truce.334 The former strong objection of Hinomaru and Kimigayo was not 
mentioned at all, but the more flexible approach towards the guidelines was seen as the 
acceptance of Hinomaru and Kimigayo.335  
      It seems these were changes Nikkyōso had to make, because of the fall of the 1955 system 
and the SDP formation of government, but also because of the Rinkyōshin and Monbushō 
policies, influenced by the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism.” Though the 
new policy was supported by about three thirds of the delegates present at the national 
conference, there were also discussions. As Yomiuri Shimbun argued, the new policies would 
not mean anything if they did not gain support in the local schools.336  
     After the truce, Zenkyō maintained its opposition against the guidelines and the use of 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo, as it had done previously. Not only Zenkyō but also Nikkyōso 
opposed the bill that suggested legalizing Hinomaru and Kimigayo.337 However,  
“the union was careful when it issued its statement of opposition to the legalization bill to make 
sure that this opposition was only incorporated into its policy on political action, not into its 
educational policy.”338 
    
    This is a fact that shows how the situation had changed and how much opposition had 
faded. Before the legalization, more than 98 % of the schools used Hinomaru at school 
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ceremonies, while the percentage for Kimigayo was lower, above 80 %.339  
      The developments that have taken place since the promotion of “healthy nationalism and 
internationalism”, its influence on the guidelines on education through the Rinkyōshin 
committee and the way the guidelines have been carried out, clearly illustrate the connection 
between the political campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” and 
the legalization in 1999.  
     The political campaign initiated in the 1980s served as a base for the legislation in the 
sense that the legislation was the result of a process that had lasted more than a decade. In fact 
it seems it cleared the way for the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, to the extent that 
the legalization would most likely not have been possible, had it not been for the politics 
initiated in the 1980s and the weakening of the union, influenced by the authorities’ anti-union 
politics. 
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                                     Chapter 7: The present situation 
     Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka argued that the legislation would not change the use of the 
symbols in the school.340 In 1998 the education guidelines were revised and were to take 
effect for elementary and junior high schools from April 2002.341 The guidance regarding 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo at the entrance and graduation ceremonies was in line with the 
previous set of guidelines and thus mandatory.  
      It was also argued that the confusion that had taken place at some public schools could be 
avoided by creating a law that defined Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and 
anthem. According to an opinion poll conducted prior to the legislation in June 1999, 47 
percent of those asked agreed with this argumentation, while 39 did not. 55 percent said they 
agreed that the creation of a law would strengthen the enforcement of Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo within the field of education.342 Has this happened in present Japan? What is the 
situation like in Japan today? 
As noted prior to the legislation, more than 98 % of the schools were reported to have 
used Hinomaru at the ceremonies, while the percentage for Kimigayo was above 80 %. The 
year after the legislation the Kimigayo percentage made a considerable jump. The national 
average for elementary, junior and senior high schools at both the graduation and the entrance 
ceremonies in the spring of 2000 was well above 90 %.343 The next two years the percentages 
continued to rise, reaching 100 % compliance for the first time in connection with the hoisting 
of Hinomaru at the senior high schools’ graduation ceremonies in the spring of 2001.344 
      The most striking point in 2002 was media coverage. Both Asahi and Yomiuri Shimbun 
published a range of detailed articles with statistics. However, the 2002 articles were without 
statistics and so small and easy to miss that one can hardly call them articles, which may 
imply that the newspapers considered the issue closed.  
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      2002 saw the emergence of national average percentages of 99,9 – 100 % for Hinomaru at 
graduation ceremonies, while the percentage for Kimigayo at graduation ceremonies varied 
between 99,2 –99,8 %. The percentages for entrance ceremony were the same. 345 Though 
some teachers continued to object and received disciplinary punishment, in the 01-02 school 
year this happened only to 258 teachers.346 In numbers, therefore, the authorities can claim to 
have achieved their goal. 
      An event that probably served to strengthen the authorities’ claim of increased patriotism 
was the Soccer World Cup 2002, arranged in Japan and South Korea. The support for the 
Japanese team was strong and a lot of people dressed up in the Japanese team’s shirts and 
used Hinomaru. However, a striking point was how many Japanese dressed up in shirts and 
flags of foreign teams.347  
     I conducted interviews in Shiozawa in Niigata prefecture, a city with about 20000 
inhabitants, with the World Cup in Japan and the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympics as a 
starting point for talking about national consciousness. Shiozawa is the sister city of 
Lillehammer, a city of approximately the same size. There were several games played in 
Niigata and the Croatian team stayed in the neighbor valley of Shiozawa.  
    I interviewed 15 sixth grade pupils at the biggest elementary school and 15 ninth grade 
pupils at the only junior high school. The children had not seen any games live, but if they 
had the chance at both schools 12 out of 15 said they wanted to use the shirt of the Japanese 
team if Japan played. When Japan was not playing they wanted to use the shirt of one of the 
foreign teams. When asked why they would also use foreign shirts, the majority said it would 
be more fun or exciting; they would feel closer to the team they supported.348 A ninth grader 
said it would be more like a “matsuri”, or a festival, and thus fun. 
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     Seen in isolation, the use of Hinomaru might be seen as increased patriotism, but taken 
together with the extensive use of foreign team’s shirts and flags, it appeared more like a 
commercialized expression of ‘how to behave at a soccer game’. 
          
            The graduation ceremony at Akamatsu elementary school, March 24th 2003 
 To highlight Hinomaru and Kimigayo’s role within the field of education today, an 
example of how a graduation ceremony is conducted might be useful. As an assistant English 
teacher I attended the graduation ceremony at Akamatsu elementary school in 2003.  
Since September 2002, Monbushō runs an elementary school project to promote and 
improve English education.349 Nihon Kyōiku Eizō Kyōkai is an organization involved in 
education programs. As a member of this organization I have for seven months been an 
assistant teacher at Akamatsu elementary school in Tokyo, a school with 458 pupils and 32 
teachers. About one third of the teachers belonged to teachers’ unions.350  
 Akamatsu elementary school is situated in a wealthy area. It is very popular and about 40 
percent of the children trying to enter, do not come from the local area. This may result from 
the fact that the school has been ranked as number two within its ward.351 Furthermore, many 
of the children graduating from the school later enter Tokyo University,352 which is the most 
prestigious university in Japan.  
I was the assistant teacher for the six first and second grade classes for seven months, and 
for three months I replaced another student as the assistant teacher for the three third and the 
two fifth grade classes. English is not an elementary school subject, and the teachers’ 
knowledge of English varied from hardly any to basic knowledge. Thus, in many cases I 
functioned as the teacher. Each class had one English class every second week. I also attended 
school festivals, as well as the graduation ceremony. 
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     Before attending the ceremony I saw how the school prepared for this day and spoke with 
the children. The school principal explained the proceedings of the ceremony to me in detail. 
The fifth grades were in charge of music. They only started to play instruments about one 
month before, but they were very eager.353 The classes made an archway of colorful paper 
decorations and there were rehearsals with all the children taking part.  
      At the day of the graduation ceremony two big Hinomaru flags stood at the main gate, but 
the flag hoisted at the flagpole was the school flag with its symbol, a red pine, the meaning of 
Akamatsu. Inside the hall a Hinomaru, smaller than the ones at the gate, hung on the stage 
wall. To its right was a ward flag of the same size. The biggest flag was the school flag, 
standing to the left of the pulpit, which was decorated with a big red pine bonsai. Above the 
stage there was a school symbol and the largest decoration was a board with the lyrics of the 
school song to the right of the stage. Below it was another board, larger than any of the flags, 
with the program. 
      In front of the stage there were seats for two six-grade classes. Behind them sat only the 
first and second grade pupils, who had brothers and sisters among the graduates.354 Behind the 
youngest children the third, fourth and fifth grades sat, the fifth grades with instruments, 
including a keyboard and a piano. The teachers, including myself, sat along the left wall 
facing the graduates. On the opposite side along the wall guests such as the head of the local 
school board on education, the principals of surrounding junior high schools and the parents 
of the graduates were sitting.    
      The ceremony was long and extremely formal; inside the hall it lasted more than one and 
a half hours. In addition, everybody waited close to a half hour before it started and for a long 
time afterwards to greet the graduates. At the beginning the graduates walked slowly into the 
hall in school uniforms, while their teachers wore national costumes. The fifth grade 
musicians played “Pomp and Circumstance” repeatedly until the graduates were seated. 
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    The vice-principal led the ceremony. It was her first time at Akamatsu, but she had 
performed the same task four times at her previous school. She was anxious not to make 
mistakes due to the formal style and thus disappoint the graduates, to whom it was an 
important day.355 People bowed at the vice-principal’s command. Then they stood up and 
sang Kimigayo. It lasted for about one minute and as far as I could see - and hear - people 
sang, including most teachers.  
     The daughter of my Tokyo University professor graduated from Akamatsu in March 1999, 
and at that time the teachers did not sing Kimigayo.356 However, as teachers in Japan change 
schools after a few years, most of the teachers had changed. The principal took on his position 
from April 2000, making the 2003 graduation ceremony his fourth.357 
     After expressing his or her dream for the future, each sixth grader was given a graduation 
certificate by the headmaster at the stage. The proceedings were formal with a high level of 
precision. Several songs such as songs form the immensely popular director Miyazaki’s 
cartoons, were played at a keyboard.358 
     A striking point was that very many of the children – both boys and girls, in the sixth 
grades but also in the fourth and fifth grades cried. In addition several teachers cried. The 
focus of the day was on parting from friends and the school, which seems like a plausible 
explanation for the expression of emotions.  
      Afterwards there were three speeches. The headmaster spoke of the importance to 
preserve one’s health and to work hard. He stressed his wish to see the graduates grow up to 
be considerate persons. While the speech of the head of the local board of education was 
formal, the head of the PTA organization’s speech seemed more directed at the children, as it 
was casual in an uncomplicated language. When entering and leaving the stage the principal 
and the head of the local school board bowed towards Hinomaru. The PTA representative did 
not do this.  
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    The next part was “words of parting”. The graduates turned their chairs and faced their 
schoolmates. Three pupils stood up. After saying a greeting the first sat down as a fourth child 
stood up, while the second started to speak, a level of precision that continued. The fifth 
grades responded with greetings; then the graduates sang “My plane”.359 The children replied 
with a song, then teachers and graduates joined in singing “Goodbye”.360 The last song was 
“Sudachi no uta”, a song about leaving the nest. Before the graduates walked out to the 
Scottish “Auld lang syne”,361 the school song was sung.  
    The singing of Kimigayo was different compared to the singing of the other songs. The 
latter the children sang as a choir, with harmonies it had taken them a long time to master. 
Teachers said the pupils sang as they had never heard them sing before, reflecting that it was a 
very special day.362 Though Kimigayo was sung, the school song was sung at a much higher 
volume and with tears running down many children’s faces, indicating that to the children it is 
more important than Kimigayo.363  
     The first and second grades waited in the schoolyard. All the children and the teachers 
formed an archway using the decorations made by the pupils. While the musicians played, the 
graduates left the school through the archway, which marked the end of the ceremony. 
     I have chosen to describe the ceremony in such detail because I think it shows Hinomaru 
and Kimigayo’s relative role compared to other aspects of the ceremony. It clearly illustrates 
that the main focus of the ceremony is not Hinomaru and Kimigayo. The main focus seems to 
be human relations. To the children the important part of the entrance and graduation 
ceremonies is to meet their schoolmates or to say good-bye to them.364 Children cry at the 
graduation ceremony because they are separating from their friends and their school.365  
     It seems the children’s interest in Kimigayo especially is not very high. It is one of the 
songs to be learned during the first and second year of elementary school.366 However, it is 
focused on in every year of elementary school. During the two first years the children are 
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supposed to become familiar with the song while listening to older pupils singing it. In the 
third and fourth year they are supposed to learn the lyrics and the music, while the focus in the 
fifth and the sixth grade is to learn to sing it correctly and to understand its importance.367 
     It is stressed that it is important for the children to understand the song as a song praying 
for the lasting prosperity and peace of  “our country”, with the emperor as the symbol of the 
unity of the people. Furthermore the importance of raising respect for the national anthem in 
order for the children to grow up as Japanese, respected and trusted by the international 
community, is emphasized.368  
     The exact same wording is used to explain the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at school 
ceremonies,369 clearly a result of the politics of so-called “healthy nationalism and 
internationalism”. It is stressed that the symbols are deeply rooted in the people based on a 
law of habit.370 However, the history of the symbols resulting in their controversy and the 
hostility with which they are still met in neighboring countries are not stressed. Both aspects 
are in line with the political campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism”. 
     Though they learn to sing the song, most children do not know its meaning.371 The lyrics 
are in classical Japanese and the children often misinterpreted them. When asked why he does 
not sing Kimigayo before games, the famous soccer player Nakata said: “It ain’t cool. It 
makes me feel depressed.”372 By doing so, he strengthens the impression frequently expressed 
among the young; it is a dull, quite boring song, which sounds much like a funeral tune.373   
      Of course the graduation ceremony at Akamatsu elementary school is just one graduation 
ceremony, meaning that the ceremony can be quite different in other schools. However, with 
the limited role of Hinomaru and Kimigayo in mind, it is interesting to note that the head of 
the ward’s board on education stressed that the ceremony held at Akamatsu was a very good 
ceremony, extremely well carried out.374 Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that it is the 
human relations rather than more abstract national symbols that are the focus of days such as 
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the graduation ceremony.  At a time when close to hundred percent of the schools use the 
symbols, it may be assumed children in other schools feel the same way.  
                  
                                An exaggerated, misplaced conflict?  
     As noted, Kimigayo is short, lasting maybe a minute. The other songs and various 
melodies, among them three of foreign origin, were longer and not connected with 
nationalism. Together with the proceedings of the ceremony, this supports the argument that 
the extreme focus on the percentages regarding the symbols and the attention in media, are 
out of proportion to the way it functiones in a school. In turn, this touches on the question of 
whether the issue of Hinomaru and Kimigayo and the struggle regarding school politics in 
general have been an exaggerated conflict, taking place in the wrong arena with negative 
results for school policy.  
      Though the expression “warfare waged between the entrenched”375 has been used to 
describe the postwar field of education, based on the Nikkyōso and Monbushō “truce”, the 
situation today can hardly be described in such terms. It cannot be denied that the conflict has 
been strong at the national level, but that does not necessarily mean that the situation at the 
local level was equivalent.      
     The conflict at the national level was more political than educational, with the two 
opponents hardly talking to each other and talking of each other in rather hostile terms 
through the press. To the LDP fighting Nikkyōso meant fighting the political opposition. To 
run education politics at the prefectural level, not to mention in local schools, in the same 
manner hardly seems possible. At this level the schools and the local authorities had to face 
each other, and the principal and vice-principal had to talk with their teachers, otherwise the 
schools would not function. 
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   Rohlen saw this as the main reason for a rather contradictory situation, with a highly 
political and confrontational national level, and the smooth, efficient running of schools in the 
vast majority of cases at the local level. Accordingly Rohlen argued: “the majority of 
Japanese schools are more independent and less political than anyone would predict from 
events at the national level.”376 
     Kyoto was traditionally a stronghold of both JCP and the left-wing faction of Nikkyōso. 
After the 1989 schism 46 percent of Kyoto teachers joined the JCP-associated Zenkyō, while 
only one percent joined Nikkyōso.377 However, despite the city being a stronghold of 
opposition towards the authorities, everyday life in schools may well have been far from these 
political activities. During interviews a Norwegian woman born in Japan in the latter half of 
the 1960s who went to Japanese schools in Kyoto until the age of 14, stressed her experience 
of the Japanese school as a peaceful, apolitical place.378 
     As a member of the “Exchange students are Teachers” program, where foreign students 
visit elementary, junior and senior high schools in Tokyo and the surrounding prefectures and 
make presentations in Japanese of their native countries, I have visited many schools.379 
Based on my experience from these schools and from Akamatsu, the typical school seems to 
be a non-political and rather peaceful place compared to the situation often described by the 
media and in academic literature. The schools seem to focus not on political issues but on 
education and problems such as bullying and dropouts.  
   During the union’s days of absolute opposition at the national level it was “notoriously 
difficult to separate ‘political issues’ from ‘educational issues’.380 It may be argued that the 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo issue as well as the general struggle was a battle in the wrong arena. 
It is a discussion that belongs in the adult world, not among children. Therefore it is positive if 
the schools focus on educational issues. 
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 Nikkyōso has traditionally been criticized for putting politics first and forgetting about the 
interest of children.381  It seems reasonable to argue that due to political fighting between left 
and right at the national level, important problems within the local schools have not been 
sufficiently addressed. However, it is important to stress that not only Nikkyōso, but also 
Monbushō was to blame for this.   
 While Monbushō as a representative of the government, repeatedly expressed concern for 
the Japanese people’s lack of pride in their nation and claimed it merely wanted to restore 
Japanese pride and patriotism, Nikkyōso fiercely fought this, claiming it would mean the 
reemergence of prewar ultra-nationalism. Nikkyōso argued that by doing so it protected the 
independence of children’s minds. However, it seems closer to the truth that both sides  - on 
the national level, turned the school arena into a political battleground advocating their own 
viewpoints instead of focusing on the real, everyday problems schools have to deal with.         
     Nikkyōso opposed the teachers training program because national and local authorities 
administered it. To many people the improvement of teacher training was considered one way 
to deal with problems such as bullying and children dropping out of school. The later more 
flexible approach regarding the teachers training program was therefore in general 
welcomed.382 Also after the 1995 conference the Nikkyōso chairman spoke of the importance 
of focusing on cooperation with the Ministry in order to overcome the problem of bullying.383 
Though Zenkyō feared Nikkyōso was handing over the “control of the education system to 
the Ministry of Education and the LDP”384, it seems more likely that significant changes can 
take place because of its more flexible approach.  
      More focus on everyday school problems instead of political issues can only be positive. 
My impression based on experiences from various schools, is that the real problem Japanese 
schools face is not the question of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, but everyday problems.   
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         Conclusion; transformation of “national consciousness” achieved? 
 
       The legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem of Japan in 
1999 was the result of a political campaign to increase so-called “patriotism” or “healthy 
nationalism”, initiated in the 1980s by conservative politicians such as Prime Minister 
Nakasone.  
      Because of World War II to be proud of Japan was a concept with negative connotations. 
Therefore, the political campaign aimed at increasing the pride of the Japanese in their nation. 
It was argued that one cannot profess an internationalist perspective without first possessing a 
clear sense of national identity. The result was the political campaign of so-called “healthy 
nationalism and internationalism”. 
     However, the strong tendency to emphasize positive aspects and to ignore negative 
problems, such as the question of the emperor’s war responsibility and that of the Japanese 
people as a whole, made it extremely controversial. Furthermore, it served to strengthen the 
problem of the confusing terms of nationalism and patriotism. The opponents saw the 
campaign as a possible return to prewar nationalism. Supporters spoke of the promotion of 
necessary “healthy nationalism”. 
    This political campaign to increase “patriotism” or “healthy nationalism” focused on the 
field of education, where the controversy regarding its occurrence was strongest, with the 
Ministry of Education, Monbushō, and the Japan Teachers’ Union, Nikkyōso, as the main 
opponents. A council on education was established under the control of the Nakasone cabinet 
to work on education reform. The report showed that it adopted the way of thinking of the 
political campaign run by conservatives such as Nakasone. 
   Based on the report, the guidelines on education were changed in 1989. The new guidelines 
made the hoisting of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at entrance and graduation ceremonies 
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mandatory. Previously it had merely been ‘desirable’. Hinomaru and especially Kimigayo – 
due to its associations with the imperial institution and war responsibility, became symbols of 
the authorities’ campaign and were resisted by teachers’ unions such as Nikkyōso for that 
reason.       
       However, it is important to stress that the struggle that took place – at least at the national 
level – regarding the symbols’ role was a part of a struggle between left and right in Japanese 
politics that had lasted since the end of the US occupation. To the authorities, fighting 
Nikkyōso was to fight the political opposition, and it seems the struggle concerning Hinomaru 
and Kimigayo was a means to deal with Nikkyōso. 
      The revised guidelines provided authority, and many teachers who refused to use the 
symbols were punished. In addition the change of political climate after the collapse of the 
Cold War system weakened Nikkyōso, resulting in what the media referred to as a truce 
between the union and the authorities. Nikkyōso gave up its resistance against Hinomaru and 
Kimigayo, while Zenkyō, consisting of teachers who had left Nikkyōso in 1989, maintained 
their opposition. Gradually the percentages for the use of the symbols at ceremonies 
increased.    
      However, there were still prefectures, such as Hiroshima, where support of Kimigayo 
remained low, resulting in the tragic suicide of a principal at a senior high school in 
Hiroshima. This incident seemed to function as an excuse for the government to establish a 
law. However, it seems this would not have been possible had it not been for the process that 
had taken place for more than a decade. Thorough discussions concerning the questions at the 
issue’s core, such as the questions of national consciousness and war responsibility, were 
avoided and the law was pushed through the Diet within a few months, even though SDP and 
JCP opposed it.  
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      After the legalization the percentages have reached close to a hundred percent. 
Accordingly, in numbers the authorities can claim to have achieved their goal. However, it 
appears that the focus on the use of the symbols has been out of proportion to the role they 
played at the ceremonies. Furthermore, the picture often described of the Japanese school as a 
battlefield seems exaggerated. The focus of the school ceremonies appears to be human 
relations, and the problems local schools face are a far cry from the level of national politics; 
they are called bullying and school drop outs - not Hinomaru and Kimigayo. It seems that as a 
result of the focus on politics, important everyday problems within the field of education have 
not been sufficiently addressed. 
       It is necessary to ask whether the legalization and the developments regarding the use of 
Hinomaru and Kimigayo in the field of education indicate that the aims of the conservative 
forces concerning a transformation of national consciousness have been achieved. 
       Large argued in 1992, “that Nakasone for all of his rhetoric did not achieve the 
‘transformation of national consciousness’... that he had envisaged.”385 However, since then a 
lot of things have happened. Based on the law legalizing Hinomaru and Kimigayo and 
statistics showing close to 100 % compliance to the guidelines, Hood argues that the issue is 
coming to an end, and with it, the discussions.386  
       As pointed out already the focus on these symbols seem to have been out of proportion to 
the role they actually play. It may be too simplistic to argue as the authorities did, that their 
use indicates that the symbols are being understood, and to consider the issue closed. A law 
does not necessarily mean that the issue fades, just as Monbushō surveys showing high rates 
for the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at the entrance and graduation ceremonies, do not 
necessarily indicate that the symbols of the nation are embraced by the pupils or the 
population in general, or that national consciousness has become any clearer. It is interesting 
to note that Nakasone himself recently stated that Rinkyōshin has failed.387 
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      Within the field of education there has been considerable focus on the national symbols.  
As a consequence the promotion of a constructive discussion in society in general, concerning 
the issue’s core, has not been achieved, but remained at a deadlock. 
     Prior to the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, the government was urged to give the 
public time for thorough discussions. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The law was pushed 
through parliament in a few months after the principal’s suicide, in what seemed to be an 
attempt to end the issue once and for all.  
    By promoting the legalization, the Obuchi government waded “into complex matters of 
history, memory, responsibility and identity,” 388 which should be applauded. The Obuchi 
government made the issue the focus of national attention in a wider context than what has 
been the case in schools, in the sense that it touched on a problem such as revision of the 
constitution. However, the same government is to blame for missing out on an important 
opportunity to promote much needed balanced discussions about the questions of national 
consciousness and war responsibility. 
    By avoiding such discussions, the law, like the guidelines, was implemented from above. 
And this is its fatal weakness. A law and statistics showing compliance do not mean that the 
core of the issue has been addressed or that questions that for so long have been a taboo have 
become any clearer. 
      Much of the politics of the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” are now 
an integrated part of the guidelines on education and the “nihonjinron” seem to continue to 
have a firm hold on many people’s way of thinking on Japan. It might be argued that the 
legislation, in combination with the politics promoted and the “nihonjinron”, have made the 
matter more complex, because of the strong tendency to polish the surface at the expense of 
the will to deal with negative aspects at the problems core.  
   It seems the emperor remaining on the throne and not being tried as a war criminal has 
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had serious consequences. His exemption from trial made it easier for the Japanese 
government and the people to evade their war responsibility. Accordingly, the fact that the 
emperor did not step down and the consequences it has had for postwar Japan, is in this sense 
more important than the question to what extent he was responsible for the disastrous war. 
Because the emperor remained it became easier to ignore the war and to bury it under a 
mountain of taboos, so that conservatives can ignore it while opponents can only decry it in 
abstract terms.  
    At the same time the lack of dealing with war responsibility resulted in a situation where 
the shameful shadows of the war made it difficult to focus on positive aspects of Japan in the 
education system. Accordingly conservative politicians headed by Nakasone, found their 
chance to express what they claimed was their concern because of the purported lack of 
national pride among young Japanese. This resulted in the present school guidelines, full of 
words on internationalization and love and respect for Japan.        
   However, despite these fine words and the law on Hinomaru and Kimigayo, the core 
question regarding national consciousness and how to feel about one’s country, remains 
unclear and has not yet reached the surface. The law was intended to end the issue, however, 
since the main problem has not been sufficiently addressed, the real discussion has yet to 
begin. It seems that ”if Japan wants to fully embrace its nationhood, it must first do the same 
with its past.” Therefore, “to find its future, Japan must face up to its past.”389 
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